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In many countries throughout the world, regulators are struggling to determine whether and how to 
introduce competition into regulated industries. This essay examines the complexities involved in 
the liberalization process. While stressing the importance of case-specific analyses, this essay 
distinguishes liberalization policies that generally are pro-competitive from corresponding anti-
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  Economists have developed an extensive set of principles for regulating a monopoly supplier. 
The benefits of unfettered, pervasive competition are also well documented and well understood. 
However, our understanding of the precise conditions under which regulated monopoly supply is 
preferable to unregulated competition is limited. Furthermore, we know relatively little about 
optimal liberalization policies – the policies that govern the transition to competitive market 
conditions – in cases where competition is deemed superior to monopoly. 
  The purpose of this essay is to explore these two issues, both of which are of substantial 
practical importance throughout the world. These issues are particularly relevant in key network 
industries (such as the telecommunications, natural gas, electricity, transport, and water industries) 
where scale economies can render production by many firms uneconomic, but where some 
competition may be useful to help discipline incumbent suppliers of key services. Our analysis of 
the choice between regulated monopoly and unregulated competition, like our analysis of the design 
of liberalization policies, emphasizes the problems that imperfect information and imperfect 
institutions pose for the design of industry policy. 
  This essay has three main parts: (1) section 2 reviews some recent experience with 
liberalization policy; (2) sections 3 through 5 consider the choice between unregulated competition 
and regulated monopoly; and (3) sections 6 and 7 consider the design of liberalization policies in 
settings where competition is preferred to monopoly.  
  Section 2 summarizes selected experiences with liberalization in three network industries 
where liberalization has garnered significant attention in recent years: telecommunications, natural 
gas, and electricity. The experiences in Chile’s telecommunications industry, the UK’s natural gas 
industry, and the state of California’s electricity industry have varied greatly, ranging from 
substantial success in Chile to substantial failure in California. 
  Section 3 begins the discussion of the choice between unregulated competition and regulated 
monopoly by analyzing simple formal models of these two forms of industrial organization. The 
models emphasize the role of imperfect information. Section 4 considers additional factors that 
affect the choice between regulation and competition, including the resources available to the 
regulator, the regulator’s independence and autonomy, the need to ensure ubiquitous service at 
affordable prices, and the importance of investment and innovation. Section 5 notes that even when 
monopoly supply is the preferred mode of industry operation, some of the benefits of competition 
may be secured by allowing potential operators to bid for the right to serve as a regulated monopoly 
supplier.  
  1  Section 6 begins the discussion of liberalization policies in settings where the benefits of 
competition outweigh its costs. The potential merits and risks of direct entry assistance are 
considered first. Liberalization policies that are likely to reduce the intensity of long-term industry 
competition (and therefore generally are not recommended) are reviewed next. These policies 
include providing temporary monopolies or oligopolies, excluding foreign investors, specifying 
market share targets for industry participants, restricting incumbent suppliers asymmetrically, and 
affording competitors unduly favorable long-term access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. Section 
7 discusses liberalization policies that typically will enhance the intensity of long-term industry 
competition (and therefore are recommended). These policies include reducing the costs that 
customers incur when they switch suppliers, re-balancing the prices charged by the incumbent 
supplier to better reflect its operating costs and otherwise re-designing the regulations imposed on 
the incumbent supplier to account explicitly for emerging competition, privatizing state-owned 
enterprises, establishing appropriate access prices, and increasing monitoring, data reporting, and 
antitrust scrutiny, at least during the early stages of liberalization. 
  Two central themes emerge in this essay. First, even the comparatively simple choice between 
regulated monopoly and unregulated competition can be intricate and complex in practice. Second, 
the decision to introduce competition into an industry is only the beginning of a journey down a 
long and winding road that can present many obstacles and detours. Furthermore, the best route 
from monopoly to competition can differ substantially in different settings. Therefore, there is no 
single set of directions that can guide the challenging journey from monopoly to competition in all 
settings.   
  Even though detailed, comprehensive directions typically are not available, some broad 
conclusions (summarized in section 8) that can serve as useful guide posts can be drawn. These 
broad conclusions include the following five. First, the greatest potential gains from competition 
tend to arise when: (i) industry scale economies are limited relative to consumer demand; (ii) the 
industry regulator has limited information, limited resources, and limited instruments with which to 
craft policy; (iii) the regulator’s commitment powers are limited; and (iv) subsidization of the 
consumption of some of the dominant supplier’s services either is not critical or can be achieved by 
means other than through distortions in the supplier’s price structure. 
    Second, there are a wide variety of liberalization policies, and the merits of the different 
policies vary considerably. Therefore, it generally is more appropriate to inquire about the benefits 
and costs of specific liberalization policies than to ask whether liberalization per se is desirable or 
undesirable. Third, liberalization policies that primarily aid some competitors and handicap others 
  2on an ongoing basis can hinder the development of vigorous long-term competition. Fourth, 
liberalization policies that remove entry barriers and empower consumers to discipline industry 
suppliers typically are the best means by which to foster vigorous long-term competition. Fifth, 
well-designed liberalization policies can facilitate a transition from stringent, detailed regulatory 
control to less intrusive antitrust oversight. However, during the transition process, heightened 
regulatory and antitrust scrutiny may be required. 
2.   Recent Experience with Liberalization. 
  To help ground the ensuing discussion of the principles of liberalization policy, we begin by 
reviewing briefly the recent experience with liberalization in Chile’s telecommunications industry, 
the UK’s natural gas industry, and California’s electricity industry.   
A.  Liberalization in Chile’s Telecommunications Industry.
1 
  The General Law of Telecommunications opened Chile’s telecommunications industry to 
competition in 1982. This law generally did not restrict the number of licenses that would be 
granted to deliver telecommunications services in Chile. Importantly, the licenses were for non-
exclusive provision of wireline and wireless services, both local and long distance. The primary 
obligation imposed on all telecommunications operators in Chile was to connect their networks in 
compliance with specified technical requirements. Other terms and conditions of interconnection 
typically were left to negotiation among the operators. 
  In 1982, local telecommunications services were supplied almost exclusively by Compeňía 
de Teléfonos Chile (CTC) while long distance telecommunications services were supplied almost 
exclusively by Entel. Not surprisingly, these two state owned enterprises were not anxious to 
connect their networks with the networks of emerging rivals. Few interconnection agreements were 
signed and competition was limited until Chile implemented a dispute resolution process that 
ensured the timely execution of interconnection agreements. Long distance competition also was 
limited until an equal access requirement was imposed in 1994. The requirement stipulated that 
every time a customer placed a long distance call, she had to explicitly designate (via dialing a 
special code) a long distance company to carry the call. The special code for each long distance 
carrier – incumbent and entrant alike – had the same number of digits. Most importantly, a call was 
not automatically carried by Entel if the caller did not specify an alternative carrier. 
                                                           
1  The following discussion is drawn primarily from Galal (1996), Spiller and Cardilli (1997), Newbery 
(1999, pp. 123-5), Aubert and Laffont (2002, pp. 39-41), Laffont (2005, pp. 214-216), and Paredes (2005). 
  3  Once new suppliers were afforded substantial opportunity to provide telecommunications 
services on terms comparable to those faced by incumbent suppliers, competition began to flourish 
in Chile. The number of fixed lines more than tripled (from roughly one million to more than three 
million) between 1992 and 2000, and the extensive waiting list for (fixed) wireline telephone 
service that had inconvenienced Chile’s citizens for so many years quickly disappeared. The 
number of mobile telephone subscribers in Chile increased nearly ten-fold (from roughly 36,000 to 
more than 3.4 million) during the 1991-2000 period, and nearly doubled again (to more than 6.7 
million) between 2000 and 2003. Prices for most telecommunications services in Chile also have 
declined substantially since 1990. 
  By 2003, nearly one-fourth of the fixed telecommunications lines in Chile were supplied by 
CTC’s competitors, rather than by the incumbent supplier. Competitors secured especially large 
market shares in Chile’s urban regions. This pattern of entry likely reflects in part the lower unit 
costs of serving urban areas, given their relatively high population densities. This entry pattern also 
may reflect regulated prices of basic telephone service that are further above costs in urban regions 
than in rural regions. The regulated prices of local telephone services in rural regions often do not 
reflect fully the relatively high unit costs of serving these regions. Instead, prices in rural regions 
tend to be set closer to (and sometimes below) cost while prices in urban regions often are set 
substantially in excess of cost. Such pricing patterns are designed to ensure that basic telephone 
service is affordable to all citizens. These patterns may be less pronounced in Chile than in some 
countries because a separate fund has been established to subsidize the purchase of basic telephone 
service in rural regions and low-income urban regions. Nevertheless, in jurisdictions where CTC is 
deemed to be a dominant supplier of local telephone services, it is required to set the same price for 
basic services across substantial geographic regions. Some suggest that this restriction on CTC’s 
ability to target price reductions to those regions in which competition is most intense may be one 
cause of the substantial market share that competitive suppliers of local telecommunications 
services have been able to secure in Chile.
2 
B.  Liberalization in the UK’s Natural Gas Industry.
3 
  Natural gas was one of the principal network industries in the UK targeted for privatization 
under Margaret Thatcher’s program of industrial reform. Natural gas was first extracted from the 
UK Continental Shelf in 1965, and British Gas (BG) was formed as a state-owned company in 
                                                           
2   See Paredes (2005), for example. 
3   The material is drawn from Armstrong et al. (1994, chapter 8) and Newbery (1999, chapter 8). 
  41972. BG held a legal monopoly over the sale of gas to consumers and a legal monopsony over the 
purchase of gas from producers in the UK fields. Since gas exploration and production involve 
substantial sunk costs, BG’s monopsony power necessitated the use of long-term (e.g., 25 year) 
purchase contracts to limit expropriation of the substantial investments made by gas producers.   
  An initial attempt to liberalize the gas sector occurred in 1982, when entrants were 
authorized to employ BG’s pipelines (at terms negotiated with BG) to supply gas to final customers. 
In addition, BG’s legal monopsony was removed. Although these steps were intended to facilitate 
competition in the gas industry, competition did not emerge immediately. 
  BG was privatized as a vertically integrated monopoly in 1986.
4 At this time, consumers 
were divided into two categories for regulatory purposes: (1) the tariff market, consisting of those 
consumers who purchased less than 25,000 therms of gas per year; and (2) the contract market, 
consisting of the remaining higher-volume consumers. BG continued to enjoy a legal monopoly in 
the tariff market after privatization. BG’s prices in this sector were regulated: the annual increase in 
the average price per therm was limited to RPI + Y – X, where RPI is the inflation rate, Y is a 
measure of the increase in the price BG pays for gas, and X is a productivity improvement factor.
5  
X was set at 2% in 1986, but raised to 5% in 1992.
6   
  Competition in the contract market was potentially open to competition, and BG’s prices in 
this market were not regulated. Although it was legal, competition did not emerge in this market 
until 1990. The delay reflected in part limited regulation of the prices BG charged retail competitors 
for access to its pipelines. BG also practiced price discrimination in the contract market, charging 
higher prices for gas to those industrial users who had no reasonable alternative energy source (e.g., 
electricity).  
  To combat these perceived problems, new regulations were imposed in 1988. The 
regulations required BG to: (1) publish a tariff on which any customer in the contract market could 
purchase gas (in an attempt to limit price discrimination); (2) publish a corresponding tariff of 
network access charges (although these charges remained otherwise unregulated); and (iii) purchase 
no more than 90% of the gas in any newly discovered gas field. This final requirement essentially 
                                                           
4   Alternatively, BG could have been separated into a national pipeline business and several regional 
suppliers before privatization, an approach subsequently pursued in the UK electricity industry. 
5   This Y factor enabled BG to pass through its costs of purchasing gas to consumers, and thereby limited 
BG’s incentive to secure low gas prices. Subsequent regulation permitted BG to pass through only a more 
exogenous index of gas costs.  
6   The 2% value for X was widely believed to underestimate the realistic potential for productivity gains. Of 
course, lenient price regulations enhance revenues from privatization. 
  5forced some limited entry into the contract market. By 1990, though, BG supplied 93% of the gas 
sold in this market. 
  Limited competition in the contract market promoted three further regulatory reforms in the 
early 1990s. First, the monopoly threshold in the tariff sector was reduced from 25,000 therms to 
2,500 therms, thereby permitting smaller customers to purchase gas from competitors. Second, the 
prices charged for access to BG’s pipelines came under regulatory control.
7  Third, BG was required 
to reduce to 40% (by volume) its share of sales to the contract market by 1995. At the same time, 
new gas fields were being opened, and entrants were able to buy supplies from these new fields.
8     
  Although regulation did not force BG to separate its pipeline and gas supply operations, 
intense regulatory scrutiny and onerous separate accounting requirements led BG to undertake such 
vertical divestiture voluntarily. Furthermore, the monopoly franchise threshold of 2,500 therms was 
removed entirely in 1998, so all consumers were permitted to purchase gas from suppliers other 
than BG. Competition intensified, and all retail price controls were removed in 2002. Only access 
charges continue to be regulated. Many consumers continue to purchase natural gas from BG, even 
though BG charges more than some competitors for what is largely a homogeneous product. This 
fact may suggest that customer switching costs or other causes of customer inertia are important in 
this industry. 
C.  Liberalization in California’s Electricity Industry.
9 
  Although the state of California’s experience with liberalization in its electricity industry is 
quite recent, the experience is already legendary. In 1996, California enacted legislation that 
introduced five primary changes in the state’s electricity sector. First, electricity generation and 
wholesale prices for electricity were deregulated. Second, as they were required to do, the three 
incumbent (vertically integrated) suppliers of electricity sold a sizable portion of their generation 
capacity, focusing instead on the transmission and delivery of electricity. By 1999, the incumbent 
suppliers had sold to five independent suppliers generation capacity that produced roughly one-third 
of the state’s electricity consumption. Third, retail competition was introduced, as retail customers 
                                                           
7  These access charges were distance related. Because BG’s retail prices did not vary across geographic 
regions, this pricing policy enabled entrants to secure a higher profit margin when serving customers 
located close to the gas landing point. 
8   As a result, BG was left with long-term obligations to purchase gas that it no longer needed to serve its 
own consumers. When BG was privatized, investors were promised that BG would be able to supply 
approximately two-thirds of the demand for natural gas by volume until 2009. As regulation and 
liberalization developed, this promise was not honored. 
9 The following discussion is based primarily on Borenstein (2002). 
  6were permitted to purchase electricity from firms other than the incumbent suppliers. Fourth, a 
ceiling was imposed on the retail price that incumbent suppliers charged for electricity. Fifth, the 
three incumbent suppliers were afforded strong financial incentives to buy and sell electricity 
through the California Power Exchange (Cal PX) during its first four years of operation. Cal PX 
was established in 1998 to run the day-ahead market for electricity in the state of California. 
Although the incumbent suppliers’ participation in Cal PX helped to ensure substantial short-term 
supply of and demand for electricity, the incumbents’ corresponding limited use of long-term 
contracts for the purchase or sale of electricity ultimately proved to be detrimental. 
  In the summer of 2000, unusually high temperatures and very dry conditions produced both 
a substantial increase in the demand for electricity and a significant reduction in the available 
supply of electricity from hydro-electric generating units in the state. When less efficient generating 
units were dispatched to meet the high demand for electricity, the wholesale price of electricity 
soared well above the ceiling that had been imposed on retail electricity prices. Consequently, 
incumbent suppliers incurred severe financial losses. The higher wholesale prices were not 
sufficient to augment the supply of electricity greatly, due to the long lead time necessary to 
construct new generating capacity and due to the particularly high costs faced by established 
producers of peak load capacity. These high costs reflected less efficient operating technologies, 
particularly high wholesale prices for natural gas, and expensive pollution permits.
10 
  In 2001, the state of California adopted drastic measures to quell the crisis that had 
developed in its electricity industry. The state established itself as the wholesale buyer of power for 
the incumbent suppliers in response to the reluctance of other parties (including wholesale suppliers 
of electricity) to deal with the financially distressed incumbents. The state also raised substantially 
the prices incumbent suppliers could charge for electricity, especially to large retail customers. In 
addition, to prevent these customers from securing electricity from alternative suppliers at lower 
prices, the state terminated retail competition. In essence, California’s experiment with deregulation 
and liberalization had effectively ended. 
3.  Regulated Monopoly and Unregulated Competition. 
  In an economic paradise, where a regulator is omniscient, benevolent, and able to fulfill any 
promise he makes, competition cannot improve upon regulated monopoly. In such a paradise, the 
regulator will ensure the firm produces the ideal range of services at the lowest possible cost and 
                                                           
10 It has also been suggested that some of the few large suppliers of electricity may have exacerbated the 
problem by intentionally reducing their supply of electricity, thereby raising the market-clearing price of 
electricity, and hence the profits of electricity suppliers. (See Joskow and Kahn (2002), for example.) 
  7will set welfare-maximizing prices for these services. Consequently, industry performance would 
not improve if an additional firm operated in this setting.  
   Of course, the real world differs markedly from this paradise. In practice, regulators invariably 
lack important information about the markets they oversee, and so will not be able to direct and 
control perfectly the activities of a monopoly producer. Because of its daily operation in the 
industry and its direct contact with consumers, the regulated firm will be better informed than the 
regulator about the demand for the regulated services it supplies, the minimum possible current cost 
of delivering the services, and the potential for less costly future provision. This information 
asymmetry generally gives rise to an unavoidable trade-off between rent and efficiency: the firm 
can be motivated to operate efficiently, but only if it is awarded substantial rent for doing so. In 
particular, the firm will operate at minimum cost and attempt to satisfy the needs and desires of 
customers only if it is awarded the full surplus that its activities generate.
11 However, such a 
generous award to the regulated firm typically will provide it with significant rent, and thereby 
reduce the net benefits enjoyed by consumers. To limit the rent that accrues to the regulated firm, 
some inefficiency typically is tolerated.  
  To examine the optimal resolution of this trade-off and to examine the impact of limited 
information on the choice between regulated monopoly and unregulated competition, consider the 
following simple model.
12 
3.1   A Simple Model of Regulated Monopoly.  
  Suppose that when regulated monopoly is implemented, the regulator faithfully pursues the 
social goal of maximizing the expected value of  U V α + , where V denotes the surplus enjoyed by 
consumers,   is the firm’s rent, and  U ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ α  is a parameter. Because  1 ≤ α , society values 
consumer welfare at least as highly as the welfare of shareholders, perhaps because consumers are 
less wealthy than shareholders or because many shareholders reside in other jurisdictions.    
                                                           
11 Loeb and Magat (1979) provide a formal statement and proof of this conclusion. Sharkey (1979) critiques 
Loeb and Magat’s analysis. Finsinger and Vogelsang (1981, 1982) and Sappington and Sibley (1988) 
suggest dynamic modifications of the Loeb and Magat policy that afford less rent to the regulated firm 
and/or can be implemented with less precise information about the surplus generated by the firm’s 
activities. 
12 This model is drawn from the large literature that examines the design of regulatory policy when the 
regulated firm is better informed about its environment than the regulator. Reviews of this literature 
include Caillaud et al. (1988), Baron (1989), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Laffont (1994), and Armstrong 
and Sappington (2005). Joskow and Schmalensee (1986), Armstrong et al. (1994), Blackmon (1994), 
Sappington (1994), Mansell and Church (1995), Sappington and Weisman (1996), and Joskow (2005), 
  8  A transfer payment T from consumers to the firm entails a reduction of   T ] 1 [ λ +  in the surplus 
enjoyed by consumers. The parameter 0 ≥ λ  represents the social cost of public funds. This cost 
arises from the distortions created by the taxes imposed on consumers/taxpayers to raise the funds.
13 
Notice that because public funds entail unit cost  λ + 1 , each dollar of public funds secured by taxing 
the profit of the regulated firm can be employed to increase consumer/taxpayer welfare by  λ + 1  
dollars. 
  The monopoly supplies a single product at regulated unit price  . The demand curve for 
this product,  , is common knowledge. The regulator sets both the unit price,  , for the 
regulated product and a transfer payment, 
0 ≥ p
) (p q p
T , from consumers to the regulated firm. The firm is 
obligated to serve all customer demand at the established price.   
  The firm incurs a fixed cost of operation,  , and a constant marginal cost of production, c. For 
simplicity, the firm’s marginal cost can take on one of two values,   or  . Let 
F
L c H c ≡ ∆ 0 > − L H c c  
denote the difference between the high and the low marginal cost. The firm knows from the outset 
of its interaction with the regulator whether its marginal cost is high or low. The regulator does not 
share this information, and never observes the firm’s marginal cost directly. The regulator perceives 
the two possible cost realizations to be equally likely. For simplicity, the firm’s fixed cost of 
operation,  , is assumed to be common knowledge. The firm seeks to maximize its rent, U , which 
is the sum of its profit, 
F
F c p p q − − ≡ ] [ ) ( π , and the transfer payment, T , it receives from the 
regulator.   
  Suppose the regulator announces that he will set unit price   and deliver transfer payment     
to the firm when the firm reports its marginal cost to be  , for 
i p i T
i c H L i , ≡ . When the firm with cost 
 chooses the ( , ) option, its rent will be    i c i p i T i U ≡  i i i i T F c p p q + − − ] [ ) ( . The revelation 
principle ensures there is no loss of generality in examining regulatory policies that induce the firm 
to report its marginal cost truthfully.
14 Therefore, social welfare when the firm’s marginal cost is   
is: 
i c
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
among others, provide less technical discussions of incentive regulation. Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) and 
Vogelsang (2002), for example, provide critiques of this literature. 
13 Laffont (2005, pp. 1-2) reports that for each dollar of tax revenue the government collects, citizens in a 
developed country bear a cost of approximately $1.30 (so λ  = 0.3). The corresponding cost typically is 
substantially greater in developing countries. 
14 See Myerson (1979), for example. 
  9        α λ + + − i i T p v ] 1 [ ) ( [ i i i i T F c p p q + − − ] [ ) ( ]  i i i U p w ] 1 [ ) ( α λ − + − = , 
where  + ≡ ) ( ) ( i i i p v p w  [ λ + 1 ][ F c p p q i i i − − ] )[ ( ], and where   denotes consumer 
surplus when price 
) (p v
p  is established. ( ) (⋅ v  is a convex function of  p .) 
  If the firm’s realized marginal cost were observed publicly, the regulator would implement the 
(Ramsey) price that maximizes  ) (⋅ i w  when cost   is realized, for  . These full-
information prices will be marginal-cost prices (
i c H L i , ≡
i i c p = ) when λ  is zero, because transfers from 
consumers to the firm entail no direct social costs in this case. In contrast, when λ is large, payments 
to consumers financed by the firm’s profit are highly valued, and the full-information prices will 
approximate the prices chosen by an unregulated profit-maximizing monopolist. 
  When the firm’s marginal cost is not observed publicly, it must be the case that   
  ] )[ ( L L L c p p q −≥ + − L T F ) ( H p q ] [ L H c p −   F −  +  , or, equivalently,  H T
                                          ) ( H H L p q U U ∆ + ≥ ,                  (1) 
to ensure the firm truthfully reports its low marginal cost of production. To ensure the firm finds it 
profitable to operate when its marginal cost is high, it must be the case that  . Because 
social welfare declines as the firm’s equilibrium rent increases (when 
0 ≥ H U
α    or  1 < 0 > λ ),   is 
optimally held to zero. To limit the firm’s equilibrium rent, constraint (1) also will hold as an 
equality under the optimal regulatory policy, so 
H U
) ( H L p q U ∆ = . Therefore, total expected welfare 
if price   is set when marginal cost   is realized (for  i p i c H L i , ≡ ) will be: 
                
2
1
[ ) ( ] 1 [ ) ( H L L p q p w ∆ α − λ + − ]   G p w H H ] 1 [ ) (
2
1
λ + − + ,                    (2) 
where   is a (fixed) cost of regulation that is financed with public funds. This cost might include 
the salary of the regulator and his staff, for example, and all other costs associated with acquiring 
essential information about the regulated industry.
15 Differentiating expression (2) with respect to 
 reveals that when the regulator cannot observe the firm’s marginal cost, he is able to achieve 
the level of expected welfare that he could achieve if the firm’s costs were observable, but the high 




                                                           
15   might also include the surplus lost when regulation retards industry innovation. Jackson et al. (1991) 
and Hausman (1997) estimate that delays in licensing wireless telecommunications providers in the United 
States reduced consumer surplus by billions of dollars. 
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1  ]∆    >    .                             (3)  H c
Therefore, the optimal price when the high marginal cost is realized is the full-information 
(Ramsey) price corresponding to the inflated cost  . The inflated price when   is realized 
reduces the number of units of output on which the firm can exercise its cost advantage when   is 
realized. Therefore, the increase in   and the associated reduction in   limit the rent that accrues 
to the firm when its marginal cost is  . Because the firm has no incentive to understate its 
production cost, there is no value to distorting the firm’s activities when it reports its marginal cost 
to be  . Consequently, the optimal price when the low marginal cost is realized will be the full-
information price corresponding to the firm’s actual cost ( ).
16 
H c ˆ H c
L c




  Three features of the optimal regulatory policy in this simple setting characterize optimal 
regulatory policy in more general settings where the monopoly supplier is better informed than the 
regulator about key features of the regulated industry. First, the firm generally commands rent from 
its superior information. Second, to limit this rent and thereby generate greater surplus for 
consumers, the regulator will design a menu of options from which the firm can make a binding 
choice. A well-structured menu of options can induce the firm to employ its superior knowledge to 
secure outcomes that are better for both the firm and consumers in more favorable environments 
(e.g., when the firm has lower operating costs). Third, the optimal regulatory policy generally 
induces inefficient performance to limit the firm’s rent. 
3.2  A Simple Model of Unregulated Competition.   
  Now consider the following simple model of unregulated competition. Suppose two firms 
produce a homogeneous product and engage in Bertrand price competition. Each firm knows its 
own constant marginal cost of production and its rival’s marginal cost,  } , { H L c c c∈ , when it sets its 
price. No transfer payments to or from the firms in the industry are possible in this setting. In 
particular, the firms’ profits cannot be appropriated by the government to reduce the general tax 
burden elsewhere. Therefore, the social cost of public funds λ  plays no role in this setting, and 
social welfare is  π α + ) (p v , where π  is industry profit. Both firms find it profitable to operate in 
                                                           
16  This fact is evident from differentiating the expression in (2) with respect to  .  L p
  11the industry.
17 
  Each firm has the low marginal cost,  , with probability  L c 2 1 . The firms’ costs may be 
correlated. Let ρ  ∈  ] 1 , 2 1 [  represent the probability that the two firms have the same cost.
18  The 
firms’ costs are perfectly correlated when  1 = ρ . Their costs are uncorrelated when  2 1 = ρ .  
Bertrand price competition ensures the equilibrium price will be   except when both firms have 
low cost, which occurs with probability 
H c
2 ρ . A firm’s operating profit is zero unless it has the low 
marginal cost while its rival has the high marginal cost, in which case the firm’s profit is  ) ( H c q ∆ .
19  
A firm realizes this positive profit with probability  2 ] 1 [ ρ − . Consequently, expected industry 
profit in this duopoly setting is [1 ] ( ) H qc ρ −∆ , which declines as the firms’ costs become more 
highly correlated. Notice that the probability that the industry supplier has low marginal cost is 
) 2 1 ( ρ − . This probability decreases as ρ  increases. In contrast, the probability that the industry 
price will be   is  L c 2 ρ , which increases as ρ  increases.  
  Ignoring the firms’ fixed costs of production   for now, social welfare in this unregulated 
duopoly setting is: 
) (F




H H L c q c v c v ∆ − + − + ρ α
ρ ρ ] [ .              (4) 
3.3   Comparing Regulated Monopoly and Unregulated Competition.   
  Regulated monopoly offers four potential advantages over unregulated competition in this 
simple setting: (1) industry prices can be controlled directly; (2) transfer payments can be made to 
the firm to provide desired incentives; (3) the firm’s profit can be taxed to generate public funds, 
thereby reducing the deadweight losses associated with other sources of public funds; and (4) 
duplicative fixed costs of production can be avoided because there is only one industry supplier.   
  Unregulated competition has three corresponding potential advantages: (1) the likelihood that 
                                                           
17 Section 6 considers the possibility that both firms may not find it profitable to operate in the industry. See 
Auriol and Laffont (1992) and Riordan (1996), for example, for related models in which the duopoly is 
regulated. 
18 The probability that both firms have high cost is  2 ρ , the probability that both firms have low cost 
is 2 ρ , and the probability that a given firm has low cost while its rival has high cost is 2 ] 1 [ ρ − . 
19 The profit-maximizing price for a firm with the low marginal cost is assumed to exceed  . 
Consequently, when only one firm has the low marginal cost, it will serve the entire market demand at 
price   in equilibrium.  
H c
H c
  12the industry producer has the low marginal cost is higher than under monopoly because even if one 
firm fails to secure the low cost, its rival may do so; (2) the presence of a rival with correlated costs 
reduces the information advantage of the industry producer; and (3) any direct, operational costs of 
regulation (e.g., the salaries of regulators and their staff) are avoided.  The first of these potential 
advantages of unregulated duopoly is referred to as the sampling benefit of competition. The second 
potential advantage will be referred to as the rent-reducing benefit of competition. 
  To compare the performance of regulated monopoly and unregulated competition in this 
setting, initially suppose  0 = λ ,  , and  0 = G 0 = F , so there is no social cost of public funds, no 
fixed cost of production, and no direct cost of regulation. Expressions (2) and (3) reveal that the 
maximum expected welfare under monopoly regulation in this case is: 





∆ − + + α
H L c v c v  .                 (5) 
A comparison of expressions (4) and (5) provides four conclusions regarding the relative 
performance of regulated monopoly and unregulated duopoly. 
  First, unregulated duopoly delivers a higher level of expected social welfare than does 
regulated monopoly when the duopolists’ costs are perfectly correlated (so 1 = ρ ).
20 When costs 
are perfectly correlated, the industry producer never has a cost advantage over its rival, and so 
commands no rent in the duopoly setting. Furthermore, competition drives the industry price to the 
level of realized marginal cost. Therefore, the ideal (full-information) outcome is achieved under 
duopoly, but not under monopoly, where regulated prices diverge from marginal cost in order to 
limit the rent the monopolist commands from its privileged knowledge of costs. In this case, then, 
unregulated duopoly is preferred to regulated monopoly, even though the former offers no sampling 
benefit. The benefits of competition arise entirely from rent-reduction in this case. 
  Second, when demand is perfectly inelastic, unregulated duopoly produces a higher level of 
expected welfare than does regulated monopoly.
21 When demand is perfectly inelastic, price 
distortions do not affect output levels, and therefore do not serve to limit rent. Consequently, only 
the probability of obtaining a low-cost supplier affects expected welfare, and this probability is 
higher under duopoly than under monopoly because of the sampling benefit of competition. 
                                                           
20 If  1 = α , regulated monopoly and unregulated duopoly provide the same level of expected social welfare. 
21 When demand is perfectly inelastic (so    ) (p q ≡ 1, for example), expression (4) is weakly greater than 
expression (5) whenever  ] [ 2 /
2
1 − ≥ ρ α ρ , which is always the case.  
  13  Third, regulated monopoly will generate a higher level of expected welfare than unregulated 
duopoly when demand is sufficiently elastic (and  1 < ρ ). When demand is very elastic, prices that 
do not track costs closely entail substantial losses in surplus. Prices track costs more closely under 
regulated monopoly than under unregulated duopoly.
22  
  Fourth, unregulated duopoly outperforms regulated monopoly when the difference between the 
high and the low marginal cost ( ) is sufficiently close to zero. Monopoly rent and duopoly profit 
are both negligible in this case, and so the choice between monopoly and duopoly depends upon 
which regime produces the low marginal cost more frequently. The sampling benefit of competition 
ensures the duopoly regime does so whenever costs are not perfectly correlated (so 
∆
1 < ρ ).
23  
  More generally, if the fixed costs of operation ( ) are sufficiently large, regulated monopoly 
will outperform unregulated duopoly in the simple model analyzed here because monopoly avoids 
the duplication of fixed costs.
24 This conclusion is a corollary of the more general observation that 
monopoly supply will minimize industry costs if prevailing scale economies are pronounced 
relative to industry demand.
25 Scale economies often are pronounced in network industries, where 
substantial physical infrastructure (e.g., a gas, water, or electricity distribution system or a 
telecommunications network) must be deployed in order to deliver service to customers. 
F
  When the social cost of funds (λ ) is considered, regulated monopoly offers an additional 
advantage over unregulated duopoly. The monopolist’s rent can be taxed to fund desirable social 
projects, thereby reducing the need to employ other (potentially more costly) means to raise 
revenue.  
                                                           
22 The convexity of   implies the expression in (5) is at least  . 
Therefore, the difference between expressions (5) and (4) is at least   
. Because this expression is non-decreasing in 
) (⋅ v 2 / )] ( ] 1 [ ) ( ) ( [ H H L c q c v c v ∆ − − + α
− − − 2 / )] ( ) ( [ ] 1 [ H L c v c v ρ
)] 1 ( 2 / ) 1 )[( ( ρ α α − + − ∆ H c q α , it is at least 
  . This term is positive when demand is sufficiently inelastic.  2 / )] ( ) ( [ ] 1 [ H L c v c v − − ρ 2 / ) ( H c q ∆ −
23 The benefits of unregulated competition may be less pronounced if industry competition is less 
pronounced. For example, Cournot competition may better describe industry interaction than Bertrand 
competition. Alternatively, industry producers might collude in setting prices. (Recall that limited industry 
competition may have contributed to the substantial increase in the wholesale price of electricity in 
California in 2000.) 
24 In contrast, if the fixed cost of regulation, G , is sufficiently large, unregulated duopoly will outperform 
regulated monopoly because the former avoids this cost, by assumption. 
25 In developing countries where consumers have limited income, the corresponding limited demand for key 
services can result in higher average production costs when scale economies are present.  
  144.   Additional Considerations. 
  The simple models considered in section 3 abstracted from several important institutional 
factors that can affect the optimal choice between regulated monopoly and unregulated competition. 
These institutional factors include: (1) the resource constraints the regulator faces; (2) the potential 
role of regulation in pursuing distributional objectives; (3) the instruments available to the regulator; 
(4) the prevailing degree of regulatory independence and accountability; (5) the ownership structure 
of the incumbent industry producers; and (6) the importance of industry investment and innovation. 
These factors are now considered in turn.
26 
4.1   Resource Constraints. 
  Although the regulator was not omniscient in the models of section 3, he had considerable 
knowledge of the regulated industry. In practice, a regulator’s information can be far more limited.
27 
A regulator’s difficult task of overseeing and directing the activities of a monopoly supplier can 
become nearly impossible when the regulator’s information and expertise are severely limited and 
when he lacks the physical and financial resources to overcome these limitations. Consequently, 
allowing competition to replace regulatory oversight as the primary means of motivating and 
disciplining the incumbent supplier can be advantageous when the efficacy of regulatory oversight 
is severely compromised by limited regulatory resources.
28 
  The resources of other oversight agencies also influence the relative merits of monopoly supply 
and liberalization.  For example, competition may be less likely to impose meaningful discipline on 
a dominant incumbent supplier if the antitrust agency that oversees industry competition has limited 
expertise and meager physical and financial resources. Consequently, both the relative and absolute 
level of resources available to oversight agencies influence the relative merits of monopoly and 
                                                           
26 For further discussion of the effects of institutions on regulatory policy, see Levy and Spiller (1994, 
1996), Newbery (1999), Noll (2003), Guasch (2004), Kessides (2004), Jamison et al. (2005), and Laffont 
(2005), among others. We focus on the effects, rather than the origins, of a country’s institutions. 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) trace a country’s institutions to its colonial origins. In countries where poor living 
conditions rendered settlement unattractive, for example, little effort was devoted to developing the 
country’s institutions. Such effort was more prominent in countries where long-term settlement was more 
attractive and more widespread. 
27  The theory of optimal regulation when the firm is privately informed about several aspects of its operation 
awaits further development. Rochet and Stole (2003) provide a survey of the theory of multidimensional 
screening.  
28 Stern (2000) documents the limited regulatory resources that are available in many countries. Stern 
suggests that resource sharing among regulatory agencies can help to mitigate partially the effects of 
severe shortages of critical regulatory resources in some settings.  Noll (2003) also emphasizes the merits 
of sharing regulatory resources. 
  15liberalization. 
4.2   Income Redistribution and Universal Service Goals. 
  The analysis in section 3 abstracted from any differences in the cost of serving different 
customers and did not model explicitly differences in the wealth levels of different consumers. Such 
differences can raise concerns about universal service – the ubiquitous delivery of essential services 
at affordable rates. When a government has limited ability to redistribute income directly (perhaps 
because income taxes are widely evaded, for example), the regulated prices of essential services can 
constitute an important means to promote universal service.
29 To illustrate, suppose a country 
wishes to ensure that all its citizens have access to clean water or to basic communications services 
at low prices. Because prices tend to reflect costs under unfettered competition, individuals that are 
particularly costly to serve (because of their geographic location, for example) may face unduly 
high prices for key services under unregulated competition. In contrast, a regulated monopolist will 
agree to serve high-cost (e.g., rural) customers at relatively low prices if it is permitted to offset the 
associated financial losses by charging prices sufficiently above the costs of serving low-cost (e.g., 
urban) customers. Consequently, universal service (and other distributional) concerns can cause 
regulated monopoly to be preferred to unregulated competition.      
4.3   Available Instruments. 
  The policy instruments available to oversight agencies also influence the relative merits of 
monopoly and competition. To illustrate, return to the simple setting considered in section 3, where 
the regulator was able to set prices and deliver transfer payments. In practice, regulators are not 
always able to deliver transfers to the firms they regulate. If the regulator lacked this ability in the 
setting analyzed in section 3.1 and wished to ensure the monopolist never terminated its operations, 
the regulator could do no better than to set a single price equal to the high marginal cost,  H c p =  
(assuming fixed costs are zero). This policy would generate expected welfare 
                     ) ( ) (
2
1
H H c q c v ∆ + α .                 (6)  
It is apparent that the level of expected welfare in expression (6) is less than the corresponding level 
                                                           
29 The public finance literature (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976) notes that when a nonlinear income tax is 
feasible, prices of goods and services often should reflect production costs. Laffont and Tirole (2000, 
section 6.2) consider the implications of this conclusion for pricing policy in regulated industries. Burgess 
and Stern (1993) review the theory and the practice of tax policy in countries with limited wealth. 
  16in expression (4).
30 Consequently, unregulated duopoly is always preferred to this restricted form of 
monopoly regulation in the setting considered in section 3.1. 
  More generally, if a regulator has limited ability to reward a monopoly supplier for superior 
performance and penalize the firm for inferior performance, the regulator may be unable to motivate 
the firm to serve consumers well. This is the case regardless of how well the regulator understands 
the firm’s capabilities and consumers’ preferences. Similarly, if the regulator is not authorized to 
compel the firm to report data on its operations, the regulator will find it difficult, if not impossible, 
to make informed policy decisions, even if the regulator has ample resources and ability to analyze 
and interpret data. Consequently, limited powers to reward or penalize the firm or to compel data 
reporting can render monopoly regulation ineffective, and so can increase the relative merits of 
unregulated competition. 
  A regulator’s powers to control the activities of new suppliers also can affect the relative merits 
of monopoly and competition. To illustrate, suppose the regulator cannot impose any regulations on 
new competitors. In particular, suppose a regulator cannot limit the range of services that 
competitors offer or tax any of these services. In this case, even though liberalization may help to 
motivate the incumbent supplier to reduce its operating costs, it may allow competitors to engage in 
cream-skimming. Cream-skimming is the act of serving the most profitable (e.g., urban, business 
telecommunications) customers, and leaving the incumbent supplier to serve the less profitable 
(e.g., rural, residential telecommunications) customers. Cream-skimming can limit the ability of the 
incumbent supplier to finance particularly low prices on some services with substantial profit earned 
on other services, and thereby undermine socially desirable pricing structures.
31 Therefore, even 
though managed competition (which entails the regulation of both incumbent suppliers and new 
entrants) might be preferable to monopoly, monopoly may be preferable to unfettered competition 
when an ineffective tax system requires that universal service be pursued through industry prices.
32 
 
                                                           
30 The difference between expressions (4) and (6) is   +  2 / )] ( ) ( [ ρ H L c v c v − ] )[ (
2
1 ρ α − ∆ H c q . The 
convexity of  implies this expression is at least  ) (⋅ v ) ( )] [ 2
1 ( 2 / H c q ∆ − − ρ α ρ . This expression is non-
negative because it is a decreasing function of ρ  and is non-negative at  1 = ρ . 
31  See Curien et al. (1998) and Laffont and Tirole (1990a), for example. 
32 Of course, a country with limited ability to collect taxes also may have limited ability to enforce desired 
prices. The relative strengths of the country’s institutions are important to consider in such cases. A 
country may be better able to measure electricity consumption and enforce associated charges than to 
prevent citizens from hiding wealth in order to evade income taxes, for example. 
  174.4   Private vs. State Ownership. 
  The extent of government ownership of the dominant incumbent supplier also can affect the 
both the merits and the most appropriate form of liberalization. A firm that is largely owned by the 
government can be less responsive to the oversight and demands of shareholders than are privately-
owned firms.
33 Furthermore, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can face softer budget constraints than 
their privately-owned counterparts, in the sense that the government may be more willing to tolerate 
losses by the firm and to finance the firm’s continued operation despite poor historic financial 
performance. Because of the corresponding diminished incentive to minimize production costs,
34 an 
SOE may operate with higher costs than a privately-owned monopoly.
35 Therefore, liberalization 
may have greater potential to reduce industry costs when the incumbent monopoly supplier is 
owned primarily by the government than when it is owned primarily by private investors.
36 
4.5   Regulatory Independence and Accountability. 
  The simple models considered in section 3 presumed the regulator faithfully pursued the social 
objective. In practice, a “captured” regulator may not do so. A regulator is said to be captured by the 
firm he regulates when the regulator generally implements policies that further the interests of the 
firm at the expense of the broader social interest.
37 Many factors increase the likelihood of 
regulatory capture. For example, a regulatory agency with limited expertise and resources may be 
forced to rely heavily on the advice and information supplied by the firm when formulating policy. 
Alternatively, the firm may routinely offer attractive employment opportunities to regulators who 
have proved to be cooperative, and the country’s laws may not preclude such offers.
38 Also, the firm 
may provide a sizable portion of the regulator’s ongoing budget, and may have some discretion over 
the timing and magnitude of its contributions to the regulator’s budget. When factors like these lead 
                                                           
33 For instance, Cragg and Dyck (2003) find that the financial compensation of managers is not as closely 
linked to the performance of the firm in state-owned enterprises as it is in privately-owned firms. 
34  See Kornai et al. (2003). 
35 Megginson et al. (1994), D’Souza and Megginson (1999), La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), 
Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), Megginson and Netter (2001), Wallsten (2001), and Djankov and Murrell 
(2002), among others, present (sometimes mixed) evidence that the efficiency of SOEs increases after 
privatization, particularly in the presence of substantial industry competition and independent regulators. 
36 Of course, in practice, this greater potential need not always translate into more pronounced reductions in 
industry costs. Mizutani and Uranishi (2003), for example, report that liberalization in Japan’s postal 
industry did not substantially increase the productivity of the SOE. 
37  See Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Becker (1983, 1985), Laffont and Tirole (1993, chapter 11), and Dewey 
(2000), for example, for models of capture and the strategic choice of expenditures to influence regulators. 
38  See Che (1995) and Salant (1995), for example.   
  18to a high likelihood of regulatory capture, the entry of additional competitors may be the best way 
to impose meaningful discipline on the incumbent supplier and otherwise ensure long-term gains for 
consumers.
39 
  The importance of regulatory independence from short-term popular opinion also is apparent. 
Producers in network industries typically incur substantial sunk (non-recoverable) costs. These 
producers also often deliver services to a large portion of the population, and so the prices of these 
services are of substantial public concern. Together, these two elements create substantial risk of 
expropriation by well-meaning, but short-sighted regulators. In response to public pressure, 
regulators may reduce prices as far as possible toward variable production costs. As long as 
regulated prices allow the firm to recover its variable production costs, the firm will prefer to 
continue to produce than to terminate its operations. Thus, in the short run, the regulator gains by 
securing low prices and ongoing production of key services. Although such a policy may provide 
short-term gains, it can have substantial long-term costs. Potential and actual producers will realize 
they are unlikely to recover any sunk costs they incur. Consequently, they will be reluctant to incur 
such costs, and so existing network infrastructure will be permitted to decay and new network 
infrastructure will not be built. Thus, if regulators are to design and implement policies that best 
serve the long-term interests of consumers, they must be able to develop policy credibility by 
resisting short-term pressures to renege on long-term promises.
40  
  A regulator’s commitment powers can be enhanced by a variety of factors, including strong 
legal institutions and a long tenure. Strong legal institutions can thwart attempts by other 
government agencies to intervene in the day-to-day operations of the regulatory agency, and can 
thereby enhance a regulator’s commitment powers by reducing the likelihood that the terms of 
announced regulatory policies will be changed.
41 In particular, strong legal institutions can enforce 
                                                           
39 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Holmstrom (1999), and Dewatripont et al. (1999) examine the effects of 
long-term career concerns on short-term behavior. Such concerns can, for example, induce a regulator to 
focus primarily on performance dimensions that are readily observed (e.g., short-term price reductions) 
and less on performance dimensions that are more difficult for potential employers to observe in a timely 
fashion (e.g., prospects for viable long-term industry competition). 
40 See Williamson (1975) for a pioneering treatment of the problem, and Newbery (1999) for an extensive 
discussion of the problem of regulatory commitment. Some authors (e.g., Henisz, 2000) have developed 
indices to measure expropriation risk in different countries. Jamison et al. (2005) review these indices. 
41 Wallsten (2001) finds that the privatization of state-owned telecommunications providers in Latin 
America and Africa is associated with improved industry performance when the industry regulator is 
independent (in the sense of not being directly under the control of a government ministry), but not 
otherwise. Edwards and Waverman (2005) find that regulatory independence is associated with lower 
charges for access to the network infrastructure of state-owned incumbent suppliers of 
telecommunications services. 
  19long-term contracts between the regulator and the firm, and can prevent a regulator from changing 
the terms of announced policies (including promised returns on investment) in response to pressure 
from other government agencies or the citizenry at large. When legal institutions are weak, pressure 
groups may anticipate substantial benefits from convincing the regulator to renege on the promises 
he has made to the firm.
42 Thus, the independence of a country’s judicial system and the ability of a 
country to enforce the terms of legal contracts can affect the optimal design of industry policy.  
  A regulator may also be better able to pursue policies (such as delivering promised rewards to 
the regulated firm) that promote the long-term, rather than the short-term, interests of consumers if 
his tenure as regulator is relatively long. Long-lived regulators with sufficient concern about future 
industry outcomes will realize that short-term expropriation of an incumbent producer’s investment 
will discourage future investment by the same firm or its successor.
43 In addition, a regulator may 
feel less pressure to pander to popular opinion if he is not elected by direct vote of the citizenry.
44  
Thus, a setting where the regulator serves a fairly long term and faces reappointment by the 
government may provide an appropriate trade-off between independence and accountability.
45 
  There is an additional benefit of a reasonable degree of regulatory independence from direct 
intervention by other government agencies. A government that is unable to intervene in the short-
term operations of a regulatory agency is compelled to state as fully and clearly as possible the 
mission of the regulatory agency. Failure to do so will afford the regulatory agency the opportunity 
to pursue its own mission and goals, rather than those of the government more broadly.
46 A 
coherent and transparent statement of the principles that will guide industry policy provides greater 
certainty for industry participants, which can encourage investment and facilitate long-term 
                                                           
42  Kessides (2004, p. 102) describes settings where governments have changed the terms of legal contracts. 
43 See Newbery (1999), Salant and Woroch (1992), and Levine et al. (2005) for formal analyses of this effect. 
Levine et al. (2005) also emphasize the potential value of delegating authority to an independent regulator 
with substantial concern for the welfare of the firms he regulates.  
44 Besley and Coate (2003) employ data from the United States to examine the effects of the method by 
which state regulators are selected on performance in the state’s electric power industry. The authors find 
lower prices and reduced investment (as proxied by the frequency of power outages) in states where 
regulators are elected than in states where regulators are appointed. 
45 See Maskin and Tirole (2004) for a formal analysis of this trade-off. 
46 In this respect, regulatory independence can deliver benefits similar to those provided by the privatization 
of a state-owned enterprise. Privatization increases the cost to the government of intervening in the day-to-
day operations of the firm, and thereby renders more credible the government’s promise to refrain from 
such intervention (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Regulatory independence enhances the commitment 




  When regulatory capture is likely, explicit restrictions on the regulator’s autonomy and 
commitment powers may be desirable in order to limit the regulator’s ability to pursue interests 
other than the long-term social interest.
48 For example, key powers might be dispersed among 
multiple regulators or divided between a regulator and other government agencies.
49 Alternatively 
or in addition, the regulator’s discretion in formulating policy might be substantially restricted.
50 
The tenure of individual regulators might also be limited.
51 
  Competition can play a particularly valuable role in disciplining and motivating the incumbent 
supplier to pursue the best interests of consumers when the regulator’s powers to do so are 
(inherently or intentionally) limited. However, competition is not necessarily a panacea. Weak 
commitment powers may limit non-fungible investment under both unregulated competition and 
regulated monopoly. Competitors, like the incumbent supplier, will recognize that their investments 
may be expropriated by a regulator with substantial expropriation powers and limited commitment 
powers, and so may be reluctant to undertake the investment required to improve industry 
performance.
52 Thus, there is seldom an effective substitute for strong commitment powers. 
                                                           
47 Spiller and Vogelsang (1997) and Bakovic et al. (2003) emphasize the value of coupling substantial 
regulatory independence with a clearly specified regulatory contract (e.g., a regulatory license). Under 
such coupling, regulators will have the independence required to implement impartially the details of a 
politically popular contract, but will not be empowered to implement any policy of their choosing. Using a 
large dataset of monopoly franchise auctions, Guasch (2004, Table 1.16) reports that the original terms of 
the franchise contract were renegotiated 61% of the time when there was no separate regulatory body 
responsible for contract administration. The corresponding percentage was only 17% when the contracts 
were administered by a separate regulatory body.  
48  The independence granted the telecommunications regulator in Jamaica is believed to have led to a decline 
in industry investment, as investors feared the regulator would use his autonomy to expropriate 
investments (Levy and Spiller, 1994). 
49 See Laffont and Martimort (1999) and Martimort (1999b). 
50 See Laffont and Tirole (1990b). 
51 Martimort (1999a) shows that it can be optimal to impose more severe restrictions on a regulatory agency 
over time, as the potential for regulatory capture increases. 
52 If competition undermines a regulator’s (otherwise substantial) powers to promise attractive returns to the 
incumbent monopoly supplier, it is possible that competition may be inadvisable when the incumbent 
monopolist is investing and otherwise satisfying the long-term needs of consumers reasonably well. In 
extreme cases, unregulated monopoly might be the most effective way to deliver strong investment 
incentives if the absence of regulation, itself, constitutes a meaningful commitment not to expropriate a 
monopolist’s earnings. Notice that although a regulator may have particularly pronounced ability to 
expropriate investors because of his direct control over a broad range of industry policies, other 
government entities also may have substantial ability to expropriate investors, by imposing excessive 
profit taxes or indirect taxes, for example. 
  214.6.   Investment and Innovation. 
  The link between industry structure and the incentive to innovate and to reduce costs is 
complex, even in the absence of regulation.
53 Competing firms may have greater incentive than an 
unregulated monopoly provider to reduce operating costs in part because industry output (and thus 
the potential cost savings from a reduction in marginal production cost) is greater under competition 
than under unregulated monopoly.
54 In contrast, substantial market concentration can encourage 
innovation for at least two reasons. First, the profit a monopolist generates can serve as a valuable 
source of research and development (R&D) funding.
55 Second, the prospect of substantial 
monopoly profit can be a compelling reason to undertake R&D investment.
56  
  Regulatory policy can affect infrastructure investment differently than it affects innovative 
effort and investment designed to reduce operating costs.
57 To illustrate this point, first consider rate 
of return regulation, which promises a fair return on prudently incurred investment. When 
expropriation can be avoided, such a promise can deliver strong incentives for infrastructure 
investment. In contrast, because it requires revenues to track costs closely, rate of return regulation 
(like other forms of “cost-plus” regulation) typically provides limited incentive for innovation and 
cost reduction.
58 Now consider price cap regulation, which typically permits revenues to diverge 
from realized costs for a specified period of time (e.g., four years), but does not promise specific 
long-term returns on investment. Although such a policy can provide substantial incentive for short-
term innovation and cost reduction,
59 it may provide limited incentive for long-term infrastructure 
                                                           
53 Cohen and Levin (1989) review empirical studies of the relationship between market structure and 
innovation.    
54 See Arrow (1962). Of course, this argument presumes that intellectual property protection precludes 
competitors from immediately copying the innovator’s discovery, and thereby eliminating the financial 
gain from innovation.  
55 This argument presumes that capital markets are imperfect. This is a reasonable assumption in the context 
of innovation because innovators often are unable to convince investors of the merits of their potential 
innovation without revealing the details of the innovation (and thereby forfeiting some of the potential 
financial gains from the innovation). See, for example, Anton and Yao (1994, 2002). 
56  See Schumpeter (1950) and Loury (1979), for example. 
57  Guthrie (2006) provides a more complete review of the literature that examines the impact of regulation 
on infrastructure investment. 
58 A regulatory policy that delivers no extra profit to a firm as its realized production costs decline effectively 
expropriates any investment the firm might make in an attempt to secure lower production costs. 
59  The regulatory policy implemented for British Gas in 1986 (which permitted the average price of natural 
gas to increase at the rate RPI+Y-X) is an example of price cap regulation. Sappington (2002) provides an 
overview of price cap regulation plans. Also see Acton and Vogelsang (1989), Hillman and Braeutigam 
(1989), Armstrong et al. (1994), and Bernstein and Sappington (1999), for example. Notice that a promise 
  22investment.
60 Therefore, the choice between rate of return regulation and price cap regulation will 
depend in part on the type of investment that is most important to secure. In settings where the top 
priority is to induce the regulated firm to employ its existing infrastructure more efficiently, price 
cap regulation may be preferable. In contrast, in settings where it is important to reverse a history of 
chronic under-investment in key infrastructure, rate of return regulation may be preferable.
61 
  The appropriate choice between rate of return regulation and price cap regulation also is 
influenced by industry volatility and regulatory commitment powers.
62 As costs and demands 
change over an extended time period, prices and costs will invariably diverge under price cap 
regulation, possibly leading either to financial distress or to particularly large profit for the regulated 
firm.
63 Neither of these outcomes is likely to be credibly sustained in settings where the country’s 
institutions are weak. Therefore, in such settings, rate of return regulation may be preferable to price 
cap regulation in the presence of considerable industry volatility, particularly if infrastructure 
investment is desirable.
64  The cost-plus nature of rate of return regulation, which ensures profits are 
neither excessive nor insufficient, can render its implicit commitment to set prices that track costs 
closely more credible than the price commitments encompassed in a price cap plan.
65  
5.    Franchise Bidding. 
  Even when pronounced scale economies render direct competition in the market prohibitively 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
to allow revenues to diverge from realized costs can play much the same role as intellectual property 
rights protection that allows an innovator to derive substantial financial gain from her innovation. 
60 Spence (1975) observes that when quality cannot be regulated directly, rate of return regulation may 
provide stronger incentives to supply quality than price cap regulation. Sappington (2005a) reviews the 
literature on service quality regulation in utility industries. 
61 Regulatory policies that deliver a consistent rate of return on investment also can reduce the variance in 
investors’ financial returns, and thereby reduce the regulated firm’s cost of capital. 
62 Alternatives to these two forms of regulation also merit consideration. As Schmalensee (1989) notes,  
earnings sharing plans (which specify explicit rules for sharing the firm’s realized earnings with 
consumers) can help to avoid extreme distributions of rent that can prove difficult to enforce in practice.  
Sappington (2002) provides a discussion of earnings sharing plans and relevant references to the literature. 
Vogelsang (2005) explains how earnings sharing policies might be coupled with other regulatory regimes 
to provide appropriate short-term incentives for cost reduction and long-term incentives for investment. 
63  This is the case even if the price cap plan makes explicit adjustments for changes in economy-wide output 
prices and changes in key input prices. 
64 Of course, if a regulator has considerable discretion over which of the firm’s investments qualify for the 
promised rate of return, serious problems of opportunism can arise under rate of return regulation, just as 
they can arise under price cap regulation.   
65 Guasch (2004, Table 1.16) reports more widespread renegotiation of franchise contracts under price cap 
regulation than under rate of return regulation. 
  23costly, competition for the right to serve as a regulated monopoly supplier (in the form of franchise 
bidding) can sometimes capture for consumers much of the surplus that strong competition in the 
market would generate.
66 To illustrate the potential value of franchise bidding, return to the simple 
model considered in section 3 and suppose two firms bid for the right to serve as the sole provider 
of the product in question under terms specified by the regulator. Each firm is privately informed 
about its own marginal cost of production ( ∈ c { }). The two possible cost realizations again 
are equally likely for each firm. Furthermore, for simplicity, the firms’ cost realizations are 
uncorrelated.
67  
H L c c ,
  The optimal franchise bidding policy in this setting takes the following form. The two firms 
report their cost realizations simultaneously. If only one firm reports the low cost realization ( ), 
that firm is selected to be the monopoly supplier, sell the product at unit price  , and receive 
transfer payment  . If both firms report low costs, one of the firms is selected at random to operate 
the ( , ) contract. If both firms report high costs ( ), one of the firms is selected at random to 
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  The contracts are optimally designed to ensure the firms report their costs truthfully.   
Consequently, a firm with the low marginal cost will be selected to serve as the monopoly supplier 
with probability  4 3 . (Thus, franchise bidding secures the sampling benefit of competition.) A firm 
with the high marginal cost will operate with probability  4 1 . Truthful reporting by the low cost 
firm will be a best response to truthful reporting by the rival potential producer if  
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where   [ ]   for   ≡ i U i i c p − ) ( i p q i T F + − . , H L i =  The binding participation constraint will be 
that of the firm with the high marginal cost, so   is optimally held to zero. Inequality (7) will 
optimally be satisfied as an equality, to limit the rent afforded a firm with the low marginal cost. 
Consequently, expected welfare under the optimal pricing policy is: 
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66 Demsetz (1968) provides the seminal discussion of this observation. Laffont and Tirole (1987), McAfee 
and McMillan (1987), and Riordan and Sappington (1987), among others, provide formal analyses of the 
optimal design of monopoly franchises.  
  24Expression (8) reveals that   is optimally chosen to maximize  H p − ⋅) ( H w [ α λ − + 1 ] ) (⋅ ∆q  
while   is optimally chosen to maximize  L p ) (⋅ L w . Therefore, prices in this franchise bidding setting 
are the same prices that are implemented in the regulated monopoly setting. (Recall expression (2).) 
The transfer payment ( ) to the low-cost supplier is reduced in the franchise bidding setting, 
though. The firm will reveal its superior capabilities despite being promised a smaller transfer 
payment because cost exaggeration entails substantial risk of being excluded from the industry. 
(Thus, franchise bidding secure the rent-reducing benefit of competition.) 
L T
  Because franchise bidding and monopoly regulation implement the same price for a given cost 
realization, total expected welfare is the same under the two regimes except that the likelihood of a 
low-cost supplier increases from  2 1  to  4 3 . In the case where there is no cost of social funds 
(so 0 = λ ), expected welfare in the franchise bidding setting is: 
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It is apparent that expression (9) exceeds expression (5).  Expression (9) also exceeds expression (4) 
when  2 / 1 = ρ .
68  
  In summary, franchise bidding outperforms both monopoly regulation and duopoly competition 
in this simple setting.
69 It does so by employing both transfer payments and price regulation to 
pursue social goals, by ensuring the benefit of scale economies through the selection if a single 
supplier, and by securing the sampling and rent-reducing benefits of competition. 
  More generally, franchise bidding can have its drawbacks. If potential operators do not have 
comparable skills, accurate information, and substantial financial resources, bidding for the right to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
67 The regulator can achieve the ideal (full-information) outcome in this setting if the firms’ costs are 
correlated. See, for example, Demski and Sappington (1984) and Crémer and McLean (1985). 
68 This is the case because    Therefore, expression (9) 
will exceed expression (4) if   ] .  This inequality holds for all values 
of 
≥ ∆ − + ) ] 1 [ ( α H c v ] 1 [ ) ( α − − H c v . ) ( H c q ∆
≥ − )] ( ) ( [ 2 H L c v c v 1 [ ) ( α + ∆ H c q
1 ≤ α . 
69 In practice, franchise auctions often take different forms. For example, firms often are invited to specify a 
price at which they are willing to supply the product in question to consumers, and the firm that bids the 
lowest price might be awarded exclusive production rights. This auction, which involves no transfer 
payments from firms to the government (or vice versa), typically will result in the most efficient firm 
serving consumers at a price that reflects its average cost of production. Such an auction resembles normal 
price competition, but has the added advantage that it can permit profitable operation even in the presence 
of scale economies. Alternatively, the supply price might be determined in advance, and firms could bid 
on the amount they will pay the government (or the payment they will require from the government) for 
the right (and obligation) to provide the service at the stipulated price. 
  25serve as the monopoly supplier may not be intense. Firms will have little interest in bidding for a 
contract they expect to lose to a more capable operator. In addition, a firm will be reluctant to bid 
aggressively on a contract if it may win the contract not because it is the most capable producer but 
because it underestimates most severely the true (common) cost of operating the franchise.
70 A firm may be 
similarly reluctant to bid for a contract when it suspects other bidders (e.g., an incumbent provider 
of the service in question or a firm that provides similar services in another geographic region) have 
better information regarding the financial returns the contract is likely to provide. Furthermore, a 
firm cannot bid more for a contract than its financial resources allow.
71 When pronounced 
differences in skills or information and/or a dearth of qualified bidders with substantial financial 
resources limit the intensity of franchise bidding, such bidding will not capture for consumers the 
surplus they would enjoy if multiple, well-informed firms with similar capabilities competed against 
each other in the marketplace.
72  
  Franchise bidding also may provide opportunities for the selected producer to “hold up” the 
government. After it is awarded the monopoly franchise, the chosen producer may attempt to 
renegotiate the terms of the original contract in order to secure more favorable terms.
73 The 
government may be susceptible to renegotiation demands in order to avoid the appearance of failure 
in the procurement process or to avoid substantial transaction costs associated with re-auctioning 
the franchise.
74 
                                                           
70 This possibility is known as the “winner’s curse”. See Krishna (2002, pp. 84-85), for example. 
71 The terms of the franchise contract can be altered to counteract the problems that arise when bidders have 
limited financial resources. For example, rather than bid on a lump-sum franchise fee, potential operators 
might bid on the fraction of realized profit (or revenue) that they are willing to share with their customers.  
See Lewis and Sappington (2000) for details. Che and Gale (1998, 2000) provide related analyses. 
72 A decision to exclude foreign investors from the bidding process (to promote nationalism or to further 
national security, for example) can limit substantially the intensity of franchise bidding. Such exclusion 
also can reduce the value of the franchise, since the skills and expertise of the successful bidder affect the 
profit the enterprise can generate. Frydman et al. (1999) report that enterprise revenues increase 
substantially when an SOE is sold to outside managers, but not when it is sold to individuals who 
managed the SOE before its privatization. 
73 Guasch (2004) analyzes more than 1,000 franchise auctions in Latin America and the Caribbean between 
1985 and 2000.  He finds that more than 50% of electricity franchise contracts and 75% of water franchise 
contracts were renegotiated. The average time between franchise award and renegotiation was 
approximately two years. Renegotiation was initiated by the chosen operator more often than it was 
initiated by the government.   
74 When all relevant dimensions of performance are not specified clearly in a regulatory contract, a potential 
supplier may be able to bid the highest franchise fee, not because it is the least-cost supplier of the 
services in question, but because it will deliver the least on all of the performance dimensions that are not 
specified in the regulatory contract. Manelli and Vincent (1995) identify conditions under which 
considerations of this sort render it optimal for a regulator to negotiate a contract with a single selected 
  26  Franchise bidding also can fail to provide ideal incentives for investment. If the duration of the 
franchise contract is short relative to the useful life of a desirable sunk investment, the chosen 
supplier may be reluctant to undertake the investment if the firm’s tenure as the monopoly supplier 
is likely to end before it can fully recover the cost of the investment. Consequently, the chosen 
supplier may adopt an inefficient production technology (one that employs an unduly small level of 
sunk costs), and all potential suppliers may reduce their bids for the right to serve as the monopolist.  
  Although long-term contracts can, in principle, help to overcome this problem, long-term 
contracts seldom are a panacea. In practice, it typically is impossible to delineate all relevant 
contingencies in a contract.
75 Furthermore, rigid contracts can preclude valuable adaptations to 
changing industry conditions. In addition, even the most carefully crafted long-term contracts may 
not be enforced if the prevailing legal institutions are weak. For all these reasons, even long-term 
contracts typically are unable to deliver ideal investment incentives. In some settings, it may be 
possible to adjust franchise bidding policies to counteract some of these problems.
76 For example, 
auction rules that favor the incumbent supplier can enhance the incumbent’s incentive to undertake 
sunk investments in the presence of short-term contracts.
77 
  In summary, auctions for the right to be the sole supplier can help to limit monopoly rents and 
to select the most efficient industry supplier. However, franchise auctions seldom eliminate the need 
for regulation. Moreover, the same strong regulatory institutions that are necessary for effective 
monopoly regulation are required for the success of franchise bidding contracts. When these 
institutions are present, though, franchise bidding can constitute a useful additional instrument that 
regulators can employ to select and discipline sole providers in network industries.
78  
   In concluding this section, we note that yardstick competition can secure many of the same 
benefits as franchise bidding in settings where different monopolists operate in distinct geographic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
supplier rather than to award the franchise to the firm that bids the most to operate under a contract that 
does not specify fully all relevant dimensions of performance. 
75 See Williamson (1976), for example. 
76  Prager (1989), Zupan (1989a,b), and Otsuka (1997) present evidence which suggests that these difficulties 
with franchise competition are not always insurmountable in practice.  
77  See Laffont and Tirole (1988). Investment also might be encouraged by adopting technologies that employ 
more fungible physical assets (e.g., wireless rather than wireline facilities in the telecommunications 
industry). 
78 Regulators can sometimes benefit by ensuring that alternative suppliers are available to replace the 
incumbent supplier, as needed. Although it can be costly to maintain a second source of production, the 
ability to readily shift some or all production to the second source can impose useful discipline on a 
monopoly supplier. See, for example, Rob (1986), Anton and Yao (1987), Demski et al. (1987), Riordan 
(1996), Riordan and Sappington (1989), Dana and Spier (1994), and Anton and Gertler (2004). 
  27markets. (For example, different water distribution companies often serve different regions of a 
country.) In such settings, each monopolist might be compensated on the basis of how its 
performance compares to the performance of other monopolists. For example, the compensation 
delivered to each firm might be set equal to an index of the realized costs of the other firms, rather 
than its own costs. This and other forms of yardstick competition can provide strong incentives for 
efficient performance by all monopolists when they are known to operate in similar settings. When 
the firms operate in environments that differ substantially (in geographic area, terrain, weather, or 
population density, for example), explicit corrections for relevant differences can be important. 
Such corrections typically will be necessary to avoid compensation that is unduly generous for 
some firms and unduly meager for others. Appropriate handicapping can be difficult in the presence 
of limited information about the precise nature of the variation in the firms’ operating conditions.  
However, some relative performance comparisons generally can help to discipline and motivate 
monopoly suppliers.
79   
6.   Entry Assistance and Anti-Competitive Liberalization Policies. 
  The foregoing discussion suggests the greatest potential gains from competition will tend to 
arise when: (i) industry scale economies are limited relative to consumer demand; (ii) the industry 
regulator has limited information, limited resources, and limited instruments with which to craft 
policy; (iii) the regulator’s commitment powers are limited; and (iv) subsidization of the 
consumption of some of the dominant supplier’s services is either not critical or can be achieved by 
means other than regulating the supplier’s price structure.  
  The design of liberalization policy is of paramount importance in settings where competition is 
deemed to be a superior alternative to a prevailing monopoly regime. The purpose of this third 
segment of the present essay is to discuss the principles that underlie the design of sound 
liberalization policy.
80 After considering the subtle issue of explicit entry assistance, this section 
focuses on liberalization policies that can hinder (rather than promote) vibrant, long-term industry 
competition. Section 7 reviews preferable competition-enhancing liberalization policies. 
  It is important to emphasize at the outset that the discussion in both this section and the next 
                                                           
79 See Shleifer (1985), Sobel (1999), Carrington et al. (2002), and Farsi et al. (2005), for example. 
Armstrong and Sappington (2005, section 4.1) provide further discussion and references. Notice that the 
entire benefit of yardstick competition arises from the rent-reducing impact of operation by multiple firms. 
Yardstick competition does not admit a sampling benefit because the firm that supplies a given market is 
fixed exogenously. 
80  This discussion draws in part from Armstrong et al. (1994, chapter 4).  
  28necessarily entails some subjective judgments. Furthermore, even though the policies considered in 
this section generally are not recommended, some of the policies can, in theory, enhance welfare in 
certain settings if the regulator is particularly well informed. Therefore, definitive, unequivocal 
conclusions about liberalization policies are difficult to draw. The ensuing discussion is intended to 
provide general guiding principles (to the extent possible) rather than precise, comprehensive 
prescriptions and definitive conclusions. 
  Successful liberalization is seldom as simple as removing all legal restrictions on entry into the 
regulated industry. Entrants face myriad economic barriers to entry, even when legal barriers are 
removed. These entry barriers include: (1) customer inertia due to switching costs or ignorance, for 
example; (2) incumbent control of key inputs that entrants require for profitable operation; and (3) 
the prospect of aggressive pricing by incumbent suppliers. Policies that reduce or limit the effects of 
entry barriers constitute vital components of a successful liberalization plan, as explained in section 
7. However, is the reduction of entry barriers sufficient, or should liberalization efforts include 
additional policies that provide explicit assistance to competitors?  
  Although such direct assistance has many important drawbacks (as explained further below), it 
can in principle increase total welfare under some conditions. To illustrate, suppose competition 
would drive prices close to the entrant’s marginal cost of production, as it would, for example, in 
the setting of section 3.2 when the competitors’ costs are highly correlated. In such a setting, an 
entrant will anticipate limited variable profit from industry operations. Consequently, if the entrant 
must incur a substantial sunk cost in order to enter the industry, the potential competitor will decline 
to enter, even if it faces no legal restrictions on entry. Therefore, entry may be least likely to occur 
without assistance precisely when, due to its intensity, competition is most effective relative to 
regulation.
81 In such settings, entry assistance (perhaps in the form of a subsidy financed by public 
funds to cover the sunk entry cost, for example) could increase social welfare in theory. However, 
the appropriate magnitude of such entry assistance can be difficult to determine in practice. 
Furthermore, such assistance can promote regulatory capture and unproductive use of public funds. 
  The general merits of entry assistance depend in part on the external effects of entry. External 
effects refer to the effects of entry on consumer surplus and the profits of incumbent producers. 
External effects may cause entry to be unprofitable for an individual firm even though entry would 
increase consumer surplus and total welfare, as in the setting just described. External effects also 
                                                           
81 Entrants may require little assistance when they are competing against an inefficient incumbent supplier 
that has historically delivered poor service quality to consumers. Consumers often will be anxious to 
secure service from an alternative supplier under such conditions. 
  29may cause entry to be profitable for an individual firm even though entry would reduce total 
welfare. Such a setting (in which it can be more appropriate to discourage entry than to assist entry) 
arises naturally when the profit an entrant anticipates from industry participation is derived in part 
from profit that would otherwise accrue to incumbent producers.
82  
  Because the most appropriate level of direct entry assistance can be difficult to determine and 
because such entry assistance can have undesirable consequences,
83 it generally is not 
recommended. The following liberalization policies (some of which entail entry assistance and 
some of which fail to reduce entry barriers adequately) also generally are not recommended. 
6.1   Provide a Temporary Monopoly or Oligopoly. 
  A common form of liberalization is to announce a future (sometimes distant) date at which 
competition will be admitted, but explicitly preclude widespread competition before that date.
84 A 
temporary monopoly (or oligopoly) policy of this sort often is adopted in part to secure the 
incumbent supplier’s support for liberalization. Such support may be important, for example, when 
the incumbent supplier is a state-owned enterprise with substantial authority to set industry policy 
or when the incumbent supplier employs a large labor force and so has substantial political power. 
  In principle, a temporary monopoly policy can have some merit. Intense competition can 
increase the risk of and limit the return from investment, and thereby reduce the investment of the 
incumbent supplier. Therefore, in principle, a temporary monopoly could increase the incumbent 
supplier’s investment, to the benefit of consumers. 
  However, the temporary monopoly also postpones investment by new suppliers, and so may 
reduce aggregate investment in both the short run and the long run. Furthermore, investment by new 
entrants may spur retaliatory or defensive effort by the incumbent supplier.
85 This added impetus for 
investment by an incumbent supplier is eliminated in the short run by a temporary monopoly policy, 
and potentially reduced by a temporary oligopoly policy. A temporary oligopoly policy also can 
limit entry to a few selected competitors. Such selection runs the risk of allowing less efficient 
suppliers to compete, while excluding the most efficient suppliers from the market. A priori 
                                                           
82 Unassisted entry by the first firm in a market generates positive external effects in that market. The first 
producer causes consumer surplus to increase and does not affect the profits of other producers. 
83 The information required to assess the magnitude of relevant external effects includes the details of 
consumer demand, the extent and nature of product heterogeneity, and the production technologies of 
actual and potential producers. See Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for additional analysis of this issue. 
84  Recall that British Gas was permitted to retain its monopoly status (albeit in continually shrinking market 
segments) during the initial stages of liberalization. 
85  See Woroch (2000) for evidence of this effect. 
  30restrictions on the number of competitors also can limit product innovation, facilitate collusion 
among the selected incumbent producers, and limit industry pressure to reduce operating costs and 
prices.  
  A temporary duopoly is sometimes suggested as a means to assist at least one additional 
industry participant on the grounds that no entry would occur if an entrant were not promised the 
security of a temporary duopoly. This rationale is not entirely compelling. If a second entrant would 
render the first entrant unprofitable, the second entrant seems unlikely to enter unless it is more 
efficient than the first entrant. Furthermore, an incumbent producer may benefit greatly from entry 
assistance of this type, which suggests such assistance may be poorly targeted.       
  An additional potential drawback to a temporary monopoly is that it may provide ample time 
for an incumbent supplier to devise ways to limit the likely success of future competitors. In 
addition, “temporary” monopolies can become permanent or semi-permanent monopolies in settings 
where the incumbent supplier has substantial political power and where the regulator’s commitment 
powers are limited. 
  The welfare losses from temporary monopolies and oligopolies can be substantial. In the 
United States, for example, service quality increased and prices for wireless telecommunications 
services declined substantially once the relevant markets were opened to more than two providers.
86  
During the mandated duopoly period, however, industry prices remained close to their monopoly 
levels.
87 Similarly, the prices of wireline telecommunications services did not decline substantially 
in Australia during its mandated duopoly period. In contrast, prices dropped significantly in 
countries (like Chile and Guatemala, for example) that did not adopt duopoly policies.
88 
6.2  Exclude Foreign Investors. 
  Feelings of nationalism and concerns with national security can lead to the imposition of limits 
on foreign participation in key domestic industries.
89 Although such limits can reduce foreign 
control of domestic industry, they can impose significant costs on the domestic economy. Limits on 
foreign ownership can reduce the flow of much-needed capital to the domestic industry. The limits 
can also serve to exclude the most knowledgeable and experienced operators from the industry, and 
                                                           
86  See Federal Communications Commission (2003). 
87  See Parker and Röller (1997). 
88 See Spiller and Cardilli (1997), for example. The UK adopted a 7 year duopoly policy in its 
telecommunications industry. Newbery (1999, table 7.4) reports that the productivity of the incumbent 
producer in the UK improved significantly only when the duopoly policy was relaxed.   
89  These concerns may be particularly strong in countries where colonial rule has only recently ended. 
  31thereby reduce industry performance. In cases where operating licenses are sold by a domestic 
government, limits on foreign participation can also reduce the license revenue that accrues to the 
domestic government. 
6.3  Specify Market Share Targets. 
  In an attempt to ensure adequate competitive pressure in a liberalized industry, regulators 
sometimes specify the market share they would like to see competitors achieve.
90 Such a policy 
suffers from at least two major drawbacks. First, market share is not necessarily a good measure of 
market power. In particular, an incumbent supplier may have substantial ability to raise the prices it 
charges for its services even when competitors presently serve a significant portion of customers. 
This ability to raise prices profitably may stem from the incumbent’s superior products or control 
over key inputs, for example. Consequently, the specification of a target market share for 
competitors may not ensure that substantial discipline is imposed on the incumbent supplier.
91  
  Second, the specification of market share targets can reduce the intensity of market 
competition. An incumbent supplier may choose not to compete aggressively against a rival in order 
to ensure that the rival achieves its market share target. When market share targets are specified, the 
incumbent may rationally refrain from aggressive competition, recognizing that it may cause the 
regulator to impose more stringent regulations on the incumbent when competitors fail to achieve 
their market share targets. The resulting diminution in competitive intensity can result in higher 
prices and lower service quality for customers, and can enable competitors to survive in the 
marketplace even though they have higher costs than the incumbent supplier. 
6.4  Implement Vague or Excessively Generous Network Access Policies. 
  Many network industries entail a vertical structure that contains a massive network 
infrastructure segment (e.g., a basic telecommunications network or a gas or electricity transmission 
system). The incumbent supplier of retail services often owns or operates the infrastructure 
segment. Given the prohibitive cost of constructing multiple infrastructures, rival retail operators 
often are compelled to procure key inputs (e.g., network access) from the incumbent, vertically-
integrated supplier. The appropriate design of the terms that govern competitors’ access to the 
incumbent’s network poses a formidable challenge for regulators. Some undesirable (but not 
                                                           
90 Recall that target market shares were specified in the UK natural gas industry. 
91 It is also possible that an incumbent’s market share might over-state the firm’s market power. For 
instance, consider Bertrand price competition in a setting where one firm has slightly lower unit cost than 
its rivals. In equilibrium, this firm will have a 100% market share, even though it has limited ability to 
raise the market price. 
  32uncommon) elements of network access policy are mentioned here. More desirable elements of 
network access policy are reviewed in section 7.  
  One inappropriate element of network access policy is a vague or incomplete statement of the 
incumbent producer’s obligations to supply access to rivals during the liberalization process.  If, for 
example, an incumbent producer is afforded substantial latitude in setting the terms and conditions 
of network access, the incumbent should be expected to employ this latitude to disadvantage retail 
rivals.  For example, the incumbent should be expected to set high access prices, limit the quality of 
the inputs delivered to rivals, and delay the provision of access.
92 
  A second inappropriate element of network access policy is the failure to establish a timely, 
functional dispute resolution process. When they operate as rivals at the retail stage of production, 
the incumbent producer and retail competitors naturally will have divergent interests regarding the 
terms and conditions of access. These divergent interests often will lead to disputes, even when the 
incumbent’s obligations are reasonably well specified. Prompt resolution of these disputes is 
necessary to ensure the timely implementation of the liberalization process. By specifying clearly 
the details of a rapid dispute resolution mechanism, a regulator can help to ensure that an incumbent 
producer does not disadvantage competitors by delaying unduly their access to key network 
infrastructure.
93 
  A third inappropriate element of network access policy is the implementation of terms of 
access that are unduly generous for entrants. To reduce the costs that new suppliers incur when 
entering a market, regulators may afford new suppliers access to essential infrastructure at prices 
that are below the incumbent’s costs of supplying the access. Short-term subsidies of this nature can 
reduce the costs that new suppliers incur as they begin to provide service in a formerly monopolized 
industry. In doing so, such subsidies may help to attract new competitors to the industry and thereby 
                                                           
92 Recall that competing suppliers of natural gas enjoyed little success until the terms of access to British 
Gas’ infrastructure were explicitly regulated. Weisman (1995), Economides (1998), Reiffen (1998), 
Mandy (2000), Beard et al. (2001), and Mandy and Sappington (2003), among others, analyze the 
incentives of a vertically-integrated supplier to disadvantage retail competitors. Of course, a vertically-
integrated incumbent supplier may not wish to disadvantage a retail competitor if the competitor is 
substantially more efficient than the incumbent and if the incumbent can secure sufficiently high profit 
margins on the inputs it sells to the retail competitor. See, for example, Sibley and Weisman (1998) and 
Rey and Tirole (2005). 
93  Recall that few interconnection agreements were negotiated in Chile until after strict mandates for timely 
negotiation and an effective dispute resolution mechanism were implemented. Spiller and Cardilli (1997) 
explain how final-offer arbitration of the type implemented in Guatemala’s telecommunications industry 
can facilitate timely negotiation of interconnection agreements. 
  33“jump start” competition.
94  
  While short-term subsidies could, in principle, prove beneficial in this regard, subsidies that are 
intended to be in effect for only a short period of time often remain in effect far longer. Long-term 
subsidies of this sort introduce at least two important problems. First, the subsidies may permit 
inefficient firms to operate profitably in the industry, thereby increasing industry costs and reducing 
industry welfare. Second, subsidized access to infrastructure can induce competitors to employ 
inefficient operating technologies. In particular, a competitor may decide to employ the subsidized 
access to the incumbent’s infrastructure even though the competitor would employ fewer social 
resources if it built and employed its own infrastructure. Thus, by distorting the technological 
choices of competitors, subsidized infrastructure access can increase industry operating costs. It can 
also reduce product and process innovation in the industry by limiting the extent to which 
competitors construct their own infrastructures.
95   
6.5  Restrict the Incumbent Asymmetrically. 
  Stringent, asymmetric regulation of an incumbent supplier that limits the incumbent’s ability to 
compete against entrants can help to attract entry. However, even when entry is desirable, the costs 
of asymmetric regulation often outweigh its benefits. 
  To illustrate this more general principle, consider a policy that embeds cross subsidies in the 
incumbent supplier’s pricing structure, and prohibits the incumbent from reducing any of its prices 
in response to competitive pressures (even prices that exceed production costs by a substantial 
margin). Such a policy has at least four potential drawbacks. First, the cream-skimming induced by 
cross-subsidies can jeopardize the financial integrity of the incumbent supplier. It can do so by 
reducing the incumbent’s sales of the profitable services targeted by competitors without any 
offsetting reduction in the sales of the unprofitable, subsidized services. Second, the cross subsidies 
can increase industry costs by allowing inefficient suppliers to serve customers. Third, when 
competitors focus their efforts on selling the most profitable services, customers of unprofitable, 
subsidized services are denied the benefits of competition.
96 Fourth, as explained more fully in 
section 7.7 below, the design of appropriate access charges can be complicated considerably when 
                                                           
94 See Gans and King (2004) for an analysis of this issue. Of course, if access prices are unduly high, 
competitors may build their own infrastructure even though short-term and long-term industry costs would 
be minimized if the competitors employed the incumbent’s infrastructure. 
95 See, for example, Hausman (1997), Hausman and Sidak (1999, 2005), Rosston and Noll (2002), and the 
discussion in section 7.7 below. 
  34the incumbent supplier’s retail tariffs do not reflect the supplier’s costs.   
  As one further illustration, consider an asymmetric policy that precludes an incumbent supplier 
from expanding its product line (e.g., an incumbent supplier of telephone service might be 
precluded from providing cable television service). It is apparent that such regulations can lead to 
higher prices, reduced product variety, and lower product quality. When a strong, viable competitor 
is precluded from a market, the remaining operators may not be compelled to compete as 
aggressively as they otherwise might. Consequently, prices may rise, superior products may be 
introduced less frequently, and the quality of existing products may decline.
97 Consumers are 
harmed by each of these outcomes. 
  In summary, although restrictions on the scope of an incumbent supplier’s operations do not 
necessarily reduce welfare (see section 7.6 below), they have substantial potential to do so if they 
are not applied judiciously. Similarly, many of the other types of liberalization considered in this 
section can, in principle, increase welfare under some conditions. However, these liberalization 
policies generally are not the best way to promote vigorous, long-term industry competition.   
Preferable policies are considered next. 
7.  Pro-Competitive Liberalization Policies. 
  The purpose of this section is to describe liberalization policies that generally can help to foster 
vigorous long-term industry competition while avoiding many of the potential drawbacks discussed 
in section 6. The liberalization policies discussed in this section focus more on removing entry 
barriers and unleashing the full force of competition rather than on handicapping or favoring certain 
competitors. Such policies provide increased potential for ultimately relying on market forces rather 
than on ongoing detailed regulatory oversight to ensure that consumers are well served. 
7.1  Reduce Customer Switching and Search Costs. 
  Competition can compel providers to deliver high-quality products to consumers at low prices 
if consumers are able to easily identify and secure service from the firms that offer the best products 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
96 Recall that uniform retail prices and distance-based access charges to British Gas’ transport pipeline may 
encourage competitors to serve customers located close to gas landing points. 
97 Service quality may also decline when universal service obligations require incumbent suppliers to offer 
service at uneconomic rates. Reductions in service quality can both reduce the cost of supplying the 
uneconomic service and reduce customer demand for the service. Both effects increase the profit of an 
incumbent supplier that is saddled with uneconomic universal service obligations. 
  35at the lowest prices.
98 Therefore, liberalization policies that help to ensure consumers are well 
informed and are able to switch their service provider easily can stimulate vibrant, enduring 
competition that may ultimately substitute for regulatory oversight.
99 Specific policies that can be 
helpful in this regard include the following three. 
  First, consumers might be afforded ready access to information about the services that 
competitors offer. Relevant information includes both price and (objective, verifiable) quality 
information. If consumers generally have access to the Internet, relevant information might be made 
available at a government (or government accredited) web site. The web site address might be 
printed on the bills that customers receive from the incumbent supplier. Price comparisons will be 
most transparent when the services the firms supply are fairly homogenous (such as gas and 
electricity). Price comparisons can be less meaningful when industry suppliers offer heterogeneous 
services (e.g., certain types of telecommunications services). Even when it is impractical to provide 
comparative information, though, basic information about how to contact competing suppliers can 
increase consumer awareness of competitive alternatives, and thereby enhance industry 
competition.
100 
  Second, steps might be taken to reduce the costs that customers incur when they switch 
suppliers.
101 For example, providers of local telephone service might be required to install 
technologies that allow a customer to retain the same telephone number regardless of the supplier 
from which the customer secures service. Absent such “number portability”, a consumer might be 
reluctant to switch suppliers because the switch would require the consumer to inform all friends 
and associates of her new number, or reprint business cards and stationery on which the number 
appears, for example.
102 
  Third, policies might be implemented to reduce asymmetries in the costs that consumers incur 
                                                           
98  See Wolinsky (1997) for a model in which a regulator often allows firms to compete directly for 
customers rather than specifying market boundaries because customers can better discern service quality 
than the regulator. 
99 Recall that many consumers continue to purchase natural gas from British Gas, even though it tends to 
charge more for gas than its competitors. This behavior may be explained in part by consumer ignorance 
regarding the prices charged by competitors. 
100 Models of unregulated oligopoly (e.g., Varian, 1980) often predict that the average equilibrium price in an 
industry declines as more consumers become informed about the prices competitors charge. Thus, policies 
that make some consumers more aware of prevailing prices can benefit all consumers. 
101 See Farrell and Klemperer (2005) for an overview of the economics of switching costs. 
102 Of course, the benefits of policies like number portability must be weighed carefully against the associated 
costs (e.g., the costs of designing and installing the requisite technology).   
  36when they choose different suppliers. For example, carrier pre-selection policies in the 
telecommunications industry allow customers to designate in advance the long-distance carrier that 
they would like to complete all of their long-distance telephone calls. When a carrier pre-selection 
policy is in place, customers do not need to dial additional numbers or otherwise undertake costly or 
time-consuming activities in order to direct their long-distance telephone business to their preferred 
carrier. Consequently, new carriers do not need to convince customers to incur substantial costs in 
order to win their loyalty. The new carriers need only provide higher quality and/or lower prices 
than incumbent carriers.
103   
  More generally, liberalization policies that provide objective information to consumers about 
the options available to them, reduce customer switching costs, and limit any differential costs that 
consumers must incur to obtain service from their preferred supplier can foster vibrant, long-term 
industry competition. 
7.2   Ensure Adequate Monitoring and Data Reporting. 
  Accurate information about the activities and capabilities of both incumbent suppliers and new 
operators is of great value when designing regulatory and liberalization policies. This information is 
essential in assessing the nature and intensity of industry competition, and thus the extent to which 
stringent regulatory controls can be relaxed. 
  Accurate information about the services that competitors supply is important in order to 
identify the services on which the incumbent supplier might reasonably be afforded more 
substantial pricing flexibility. Market concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl Index, for 
example) can sometimes serve as an imperfect indicator of the intensity of market competition. 
Information about the installed capacity of competitors can be of greater value in assessing both the 
current and likely future intensity of market competition, as can detailed knowledge of the entry 
barriers that competitors face. 
  To ensure the timely availability of the information required to formulate appropriate 
liberalization policies, it is important to establish data reporting requirements. The requirements 
should specify clearly what data must be reported, how often it must be reported, and which entities 
                                                           
103 Waterson (2003) discusses the potential merits of requiring customers to choose their supplier annually, 
along the lines of annual policy renewals that are common in the insurance industry. While such a 
requirement can reduce the differential costs that customers incur in choosing to receive service from a 
new entrant rather than continuing to receive service from the incumbent supplier, the policy increases 
transactions costs for all consumers, not only for those who switch suppliers. The same is true of Chile’s 
equal access policy, which, recall, requires callers to specify their preferred carrier every time they place a 
long distance call. 
  37must report the data. The data reporting requirements should be changed as infrequently as possible, 
so as to limit the costs imposed on the reporting entities (and to provide a consistent time series of 
data).
104 
7.3  Privatize State-Owned Enterprises. 
  When the incumbent supplier is owned (wholly or primarily) by the government rather than by 
private investors, privatization of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) can be an important element of a 
successful liberalization policy. By hardening soft budget constraints and promoting profit 
maximization, privatization of an SOE (i.e., selling the firm to private investors) can: (i) serve to 
focus the firm’s efforts on reducing its operating costs and delivering high-quality services to 
consumers; and (ii) reduce a firm’s incentive and ability to engage in below-cost pricing which can 
preclude the efficient operation of more efficient competitors.
105 
  In settings where a government’s commitment powers are limited, partial privatization of an 
SOE may be preferable to full privatization. When the government retains an ownership stake in the 
firm, the government, like private investors, will suffer financially if it implements policies that 
reduce the firm’s earnings. Consequently, a promise by the government not to expropriate private 
investors may be more credible when the firm is partially privatized than when it is fully 
privatized.
106 Widespread domestic distribution of the privately-held shares of the (partially) 
privatized firm can have a similar effect. In the presence of such widespread domestic ownership of 
the privatized firm, any policy the government might implement that seriously erodes the earnings 
of the firm would likely evoke widespread, popular opposition. Fearful of the political ramifications 
of any such widespread opposition, the government will be reluctant to expropriate the privatized 
firm.
107 
7.4  Re-balance Retail Tariffs to Better Reflect Costs. 
  Vibrant long-term industry competition can also be fostered by re-balancing the prices the 
incumbent supplier charges for its services. Rate re-balancing occurs when prices are aligned more 
                                                           
104  Regulators may rationally choose to keep some of the reported data confidential. Confidentiality can 
protect proprietary business plans and limit undesired information sharing among industry participants. 
105  Sappington and Sidak (2003) note that an SOE’s reduced focus on profit can increase its incentives to 
engage in anticompetitive activities. If, for example, an SOE is more concerned with market share than 
profit, the SOE may be more willing than a profit-maximizing firm to implement below-cost pricing for an 
extended period of time.  
106 See, for example, Perotti and Guney (1993), Perotti (1995), and Bel (2003). 
107 See Armstrong et al. (1994), Biais and Perotti (2002), and Bel (2003).  
  38closely with incremental production costs. Ideally, the desired rate re-balancing should be 
completed at the outset of the liberalization process in order to provide appropriate signals to 
potential competitors about their likely returns from long-term industry operation. Although prices 
that diverge from cost can help to achieve desired income distribution, pricing structures that embed 
cross-subsidies are inappropriate when industry liberalization is under way because they introduce 
the problems identified in section 6.5.   
  To avoid these problems, the price charged for each of an incumbent’s services should be set at 
or above the firm’s incremental cost of providing the service.
108 Such rate re-balancing helps to 
direct the forces of competition to those services that competitors can supply more efficiently than 
the incumbent supplier, and allow the incumbent supplier to deliver the services that it can supply 
more efficiently than its rivals. 
  In settings where rate re-balancing would require dramatic increases in the prices of certain 
essential services, strong opposition to the re-balancing may arise. To ameliorate this opposition, 
rates might be re-balanced gradually over time, even though complete re-balancing at the outset of 
liberalization is preferable, when it is feasible. Alternatively, or in addition, financial support might 
be provided directly to the customers that would find the price increases to be most burdensome. 
Such a policy can replace implicit subsidies to all consumers with explicit subsidies to those with 
the greatest need for financial assistance.
109 If the country’s tax system is relatively efficient, 
general tax revenue can be the best source of funds for the explicit, targeted subsidies in the 
regulated industry.
110 If the subsidies must be funded entirely within the regulated industry, taxes 
can be imposed on services that are deemed to be less essential (e.g., the services whose prices were 
set well above the incumbent’s costs prior to liberalization). Any such commodity taxes should 
apply symmetrically to all suppliers, so as not to distort the competitive process.
111 
7.5   Allow Adequate, But Not Unlimited, Pricing Flexibility. 
  If it has no freedom to change the prices it charges for its services, the incumbent supplier will 
have limited ability to respond to the challenges presented by competitors. Consequently, 
                                                           
108  In the presence of scale and scope economies, it may not be possible to set tariffs that reflect marginal 
production costs without inflicting a financial deficit on the incumbent supplier. 
109Recall that Chile implemented a program to subsidize the purchase of basic telephone service by citizens 
in rural regions and low-income urban areas (Laffont, 2005, p. 216). 
110 See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Laffont and Tirole (2000, chapter 6). 
111 Armstrong (2002, section 2.1) discusses the design and implementation of such taxes.  
  39competitors may survive in the market even if they are less efficient than the incumbent supplier.
112  
  Price cap regulation can provide incumbent suppliers some pricing flexibility while limiting 
undue exercise of market power. Price cap regulation plans typically constrain the rate at which the 
regulated firm’s prices can rise on average, without specifying the exact price that must be charged 
for any particular service. The application of distinct price cap constraints to distinct groups of 
services can afford the incumbent supplier some flexibility to respond to competitive challenges 
without allowing the firm to abuse its market power. To illustrate, the firm might be permitted to 
increase by five percent annually the average of the prices it charges for services that are supplied 
by competitors. The firm might also be allowed to increase by one percent annually the average of 
the prices it charges for services that generally are not supplied by competitors. Pricing restrictions 
like these that impose different and separate constraints on different groups of services can provide 
adequate protection for customers who have no competitive alternatives while affording the 
incumbent supplier a reasonable opportunity to respond to emerging competitive challenges.
113 
  In addition, incumbents should generally be precluded from pricing an established service 
below the incremental cost of providing the service (unless they are required to do so as part of a 
universal service obligation). As explained above, below-cost pricing can preclude the operation of 
more efficient suppliers, and thereby raise industry costs.
114 Below-cost pricing also encourages 
excessive consumption (i.e., consumption beyond the point at which the marginal benefit of 
consumption is equal to the marginal cost of production). 
  It is particularly important to monitor and implement procedures to preclude below-cost pricing 
by a firm that operates under price cap regulation. This is because such a firm can have a 
                                                           
112  Recall that some observers believe the success enjoyed by new suppliers of local telecommunications 
services in Chile may be due in part to the limits placed on CTC’s ability to reduce prices selectively in 
response to competitors’ prices (Paredes, 2005). 
113  Armstrong et al. (1994, section 7.5.4) describe how British Telecom used the pricing flexibility it was 
afforded by price cap regulation to reduce prices substantially on long distance telephone calls (that were 
also supplied by competitors) while raising prices for local telephone calls (for which there were 
essentially no other suppliers). 
114  In settings where an incumbent, vertically-integrated producer (VIP) otherwise has considerable pricing 
flexibility, the relevant price floor can include an “imputation” requirement in order to prevent a price 
squeeze. A price squeeze occurs when a VIP sets a price for a key input that exceeds the price of the VIP’s 
relevant retail service. An imputation requirement obligates the VIP to price its retail service above the 
sum of the VIP’s (downstream) unit cost of producing the retail service and the unit price the VIP charges 
its retails competitors for the key input. Thus, the lower bound on the price of the VIP’s retail product is 
the usual incremental cost floor, with one exception. The VIP’s cost of producing the key input is imputed 
as the input cost that the VIP imposes on its retail competitors. This price floor is thus the incremental cost 
the VIP would incur if it faced the same input cost as its rivals. This imputation procedure avoids price 
squeezes, and thereby helps to ensure that the most efficient providers supply the retail service. 
  40particularly strong incentive to price below cost the services on which it faces particularly intense 
competition. Under a price cap plan that restricts the rate at which all of the firm’s prices can 
increase on average, a substantial reduction in the price of one service can authorize a pronounced 
increase in the price of another service. By permitting increases in net revenue on some services that 
offset corresponding reductions from below-cost pricing on other services, price cap regulation 
plans can enhance the incentives of an incumbent regulated firm to set predatory prices that can 
serve to drive its rivals from the market.
115 Therefore, safeguards against below-cost pricing are an 
important component of price cap regulation plans. 
7.6   Prevent Disadvantaging of Downstream Competitors. 
  Vertically-integrated producers (VIPs) that both sell essential inputs to retail producers and 
supply the retail service themselves can disadvantage their rivals through anticompetitive actions 
other than predatory pricing. For example, consider a setting where a VIP operates under price cap 
regulation. Suppose the price cap regulation plan imposes a single over-arching restriction on the 
prices of all of the VIP’s services, both retail and wholesale services. Under such a restriction, price 
reductions on retail services effectively authorize price increases on wholesale services. Both price 
changes are disadvantageous for retail competitors who must purchase the VIP’s wholesale 
services. To limit such disadvantaging of rivals, it generally is advisable to place separate 
restrictions on the rate at which a VIP’s wholesale service prices can rise and on the rate at which its 
retail service prices can rise.
116 
    VIPs can disadvantage retail competitors through means other than strategic pricing. For 
example, as indicated in section 6.4, a VIP could intentionally reduce the quality of the inputs it 
delivers to its downstream competitors, and thereby limit the competitors’ ability to deliver high 
quality services to their customers.
117 To limit undesirable strategic disadvantaging of rivals, careful 
monitoring of the quality of the inputs that a VIP delivers to its downstream rivals can be advisable, 
as can an explicit schedule of penalties for unduly low service quality and, perhaps, rewards for 
exceptionally high levels of service quality.
118 Structural separation of the VIP’s wholesale and 
retail operations can facilitate accurate monitoring of the relative prices and qualities of the inputs 
                                                           
115 See Armstrong and Vickers (1993).  
116 Laffont and Tirole (1996) note that when wholesale and retail services are treated as separate baskets of 
services in this manner, a VIP’s ability and incentive to implement Ramsey prices may be reduced. 
117 Reiffen et al. (2000) and Zimmerman (2003) provide some evidence of this effect. 
118 Wood and Sappington (2004) discuss the design of such reward structures.  
  41that the VIP supplies to its own retail affiliates and to competing retailers.
119  In assessing the merits 
of structural separation, this potential benefit should be weighed against any associated costs, 
including foregone economies of scope. 
  A more radical alternative to structural separation is ownership separation. Under structural 
separation, wholesale and retail operations are physically separated, but common ownership and 
control of both operations is permitted. In contrast, ownership separation precludes common 
ownership and control of wholesale and retail operations. While structural separation can help to 
limit the ability of a VIP to disadvantage its retail competitors, ownership separation can serve to 
reduce the incentive a producer of key wholesale services might have to disadvantage the (retail) 
firms that purchase the wholesale services. When it does not provide retail services, the wholesale 
provider does not secure any direct gains in the retail market from disadvantaging retail producers. 
In fact, a reduction in the quality of the inputs it sells generally will reduce the demand for these 
inputs, and thereby reduce the revenues of the wholesale producer. Consequently, by eliminating 
the key source of potential gains from disadvantaging downstream operators, ownership separation 
can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, incentives for such disadvantaging.
120 
  Of course, the costs of ownership separation must be weighed carefully against its potential 
benefits. Ownership separation, like structural separation, may sacrifice substantial economies of 
scope and economies associated with integrated planning of wholesale and retail operations. 
Ownership separation may also preclude a particularly efficient competitor (the producer of 
wholesale services) from participating in the retail market, and thereby raise industry costs and 
retail prices. Ownership separation also can entail substantial divestiture costs in cases where a VIP 
is already providing both wholesale and retail services when ownership separation is considered.
121 
The merits of ownership separation also can depend on the prevailing regulatory institutions. A 
regulator with ample resources, considerable experience, and substantial authority to collect 
relevant data may be able to prevent a VIP from disadvantaging its rivals. In contrast, a regulator 
with limited resources, limited experience, and limited information might be unable to do so, 
                                                           
119Hausman and Sidak (2005) review the form of structural separation under consideration by Ofcom, the UK 
communications regulator. The separation includes the creation of a separate division of British Telecom 
to supply wholesale services on the same terms and conditions to all retail competitors and an “equality of 
access” board to oversee the operations of this division. 
120  Vertical divestiture of the incumbent also can simplify the design of access charges by eliminating the 
effects of access charges on the incentives of a VIP to disadvantage retail competitors. Beard et al. (2001), 
among others, consider how access charges affect the incentives of a VIP to disadvantage rivals. 
121 See Vickers (1995), Hinton et al. (1998), Lee and Hamilton (1999), Crandall and Sidak (2002), Buehler et 
al. (2005), and Crew et al. (2005), for example, for analyses of these and related considerations. 
  42rendering vertical separation the best (albeit a costly) way to promote effective competition. 
7.7  Establish Appropriate Access Prices. 
  The prices that retail competitors must pay to access the infrastructure of an incumbent VIP can 
have a substantial impact on welfare. A comprehensive assessment of the effects of access prices on 
welfare is complex. However, some of the key effects can be illustrated in the following simple 
setting.
122   
  Suppose an incumbent VIP incurs marginal cost   in supplying a single retail service and 
marginal cost   in supplying a single network input to a single retail competitor. This competitor, 
the entrant, incurs constant unit cost   in converting one unit of the access service into one unit of 
its own retail service. (The production technology is fixed proportions, so exactly one unit of the 
access service is required to produce each unit of the retail service.) The retail services of the 
incumbent and the entrant are homogeneous, and consumers purchase the product from the firm that 




  Suppose the regulator sets retail price  p  and access price   for the incumbent’s services in 
this setting. Then the entrant will find it profitable to operate if the highest price (
a
p ) it can charge 
for its retail service exceeds its unit cost ( c a + ) of producing the service. Industry production 
costs are minimized when the least-cost supplier serves all retail customers. The entrant is the least-
cost supplier in this setting when ( c c + 2 ) is less than  . Therefore, for fixed regulated retail 





] [ 1 2 c p c a − + = .               (10) 
  The access price in equation (10) reflects the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), which 
states that the access charge should be set equal to the sum of the incumbent VIP’s cost of 
supplying access ( ) and the opportunity cost (or lost profit,  2 c 1 c p − ) the VIP incurs when it loses a 
unit of business to the entrant.
124  The ECPR implies that when the VIP’s regulated retail price 
exceeds its cost of supplying the retail service (so  ), the access charge should exceed the  1 c p >
                                                           
122 See Armstrong (2002) and Vogelsang (2003) for more detailed surveys of this topic. 
123 Notice that this discussion takes the incumbent’s retail tariff as given. Ideally, wholesale and retail prices 
should be set simultaneously to achieve social goals, following standard Ramsey principles (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1994). 
124 See Willig (1979) and Baumol (1983) for early discussions of this rule.  
  43VIP’s cost of providing access. This increase in the access charge serves to limit the operation of 
inefficient entrants. To see why, notice that if a VIP is obligated to both supply network access at 
cost and set the price of its retail service above cost ( ), an inefficient entrant (i.e., one for 
which   >  ) might find it profitable to enter the market, raising industry production costs. 
This inefficient entry can be precluded by raising the access charge above cost by the same amount 
the retail tariff is held above cost (
1 c p >
c c + 2 1 c
1 c p − ).
125 Similarly, if the VIP is required to offer a retail 
service at a price below cost ( ), network access can be subsidized accordingly to encourage 
efficient entry into the subsidized retail market.
126   
1 c p <
  Intuitively, one might view the VIP as paying a unit tax of  1 c p −  when it is required to supply 
the retail service to consumers at unit price . To ensure profitable entry only by competitors that 
are more efficient than the VIP, entrants must pay the same tax the VIP pays. The ECPR 
implements this tax by raising the access charge above the VIP’s cost of supplying access by 
.  
p
1 c p −
  This simple analysis requires modification in richer settings. Suppose, for example, the retail 
services of the entrant and the VIP are not homogeneous. In this case, one unit of supply by the 
entrant does not necessarily reduce the VIP’s retail output by exactly one unit, and so the ECPR 
must be adjusted accordingly.
127 Alternatively, suppose the VIP’s retail price is not immutable 
(perhaps because the VIP operates under a price cap regulation plan that affords the firm some 
discretion in setting retail prices). In this case, the established access charge will affect the VIP’s 
choice of retail tariff. The ECPR requires additional modification to reflect this interaction.
128   
  The design of access prices becomes more complicated if an entrant can supply the input itself, 
by investing in its own infrastructure, for instance. In such a setting, care must be taken to ensure 
that access charges provide the entrant with appropriate (“make-or-buy”) incentives to supply inputs 
itself rather than purchase them from the incumbent VIP. Two distinct regulatory instruments would 
be ideal in such a setting. To deliver appropriate make-or-buy incentives to entrants, the VIP’s 
                                                           
125This increase in the access charge above the cost of supplying access can help to mitigate the cream-
skimming problem discussed in section 7.4 above. 
126When access charges reflect the ECPR, a VIP is compensated for the profit reduction it incurs when it 
loses a retail customer to a rival supplier. Consequently, access prices that reflect the ECPR can limit a 
VIP’s incentive to disadvantage retail rivals. 
127Armstrong et al. (1996) provide the details of this and other extensions of the ECPR, along with a more 
general characterization of optimal access prices. 
128See Armstrong (2002, section 2.6) for further discussion of this issue. 
  44access charge should be set equal to the VIP’s cost ( ) of providing the input. This policy ensures 
an efficient pattern of production given that entry takes place. Such cost-based access pricing may 
not ensure industry cost minimization, though, because inefficient retail competitors may find entry 
profitable or efficient competitors may find entry unprofitable when retail prices diverge from the 
VIP’s production costs ( ).  To ensure efficient entry decisions, cost-based access charges 
should be accompanied by a tax on the outputs of entrants that reflects the deviation of the VIP’s 
retail price from its cost ( ).
129  When the regulator is unable to implement output taxes, the 
access charge is forced to perform the dual task of providing efficient make-or-buy decisions and 
efficient entry decisions.
130 Typically, a single instrument cannot achieve two goals, making some 
compromise inevitable.
131   
2 c
1 c p ≠
1 c p −
  In summary, the appropriate design of access charges can require considerable information. 
Furthermore, the delivery of appropriate incentives for efficient make-or-buy and industry 
participation decisions can require an extensive set of regulatory instruments (e.g., access prices and 
output taxes). In settings where a regulator has limited information and limited powers, the design 
of access charges can present extremely challenging problems. However, these problems can be 
mitigated if the incumbent VIP’s retail tariffs reflect its production costs, as proposed in section 7.4 
above. When retail rates reflect costs (so  1 c p = ) in the simple setting considered here, the ECPR 
in equation (10) collapses to a particularly simple rule: the access charge should be set equal to the 
VIP’s cost of providing access. As noted above, this rule also provides appropriate make-or-buy 
incentives. Notice that this policy can require little knowledge of consumer demand, and does not 
require the regulator to be able to control the activities of entrants. In sum, an effective rebalancing 
of the incumbent VIP’s retail tariff greatly simplifies the regulator’s task of setting appropriate 
access charges, and allows access charges to focus on the single task of ensuring appropriate make-
or-buy decisions. 
  Access prices also can affect incentives for network innovation and cost reduction. For 
example, access prices that provide profit margins on access services that vary inversely with the 
incumbent VIP’s realized access costs can create incentives for the VIP to reduce its costs of 
                                                           
129 See Armstrong (2002, section 2.4) for further discussion of this point.  
130 Sappington (2005b) notes that if retail prices are not regulated, efficient make-or-buy decisions may arise 
even when access charges do not reflect the incumbent’s production costs. 
131Hausman (1997) and Hausman and Sidak (1999, 2005), among others, note that competitors will rely 
unduly on an incumbent supplier’s infrastructure if access prices are set below the full cost of supplying 
access. This full cost includes a capital cost that reflects prevailing technological and market risks. 
  45supplying access.
132 Clearly, the appropriate design of access charges becomes more complex when 
access charges serve to motivate cost reduction in addition to securing industry cost minimization 
and inducing efficient make-or-buy decisions. 
  Conceivably, access prices might be set at relatively high levels to systematically encourage 
entrants to construct their own infrastructure. One reason for doing so (despite the duplicative 
infrastructure costs such a policy can promote) would be to promote competition among multiple 
producers, in hopes of fostering industry innovation and eliminating the need for long-term 
regulation of a monopoly supplier of key inputs.
133 However, competition among facilities-based 
networks will not necessarily eliminate the need for long-term regulation. Even if all operators in 
the telecommunications industry employ their own infrastructure, each operator must still 
interconnect with other operators in order to complete calls intended for the customers of other 
operators. It is conceivable that unregulated negotiations among similarly situated network 
operators could produce inter-carrier compensation arrangements that are broadly consistent with 
social goals. However, this need not be the case. Firms might negotiate compensation arrangements 
that inhibit competition or limit new entry, for example.
134  
7.8   Limit Cost Shifting. 
  In settings where regulatory controls are relaxed on some, but not all, of the incumbent 
supplier’s operations, it can be important to limit the supplier’s ability to engage in cost shifting. 
Cost shifting occurs when costs that actually are incurred in the production of one set of services 
(e.g., competitive services) are recorded as costs incurred in the production of a different set of 
services (e.g., monopoly services). An incumbent supplier may benefit from cost shifting when, for 
example, its competitive operations are not regulated but the prices it can charge for its monopoly 
services are linked directly to its measured operating costs.  In this situation, the incumbent supplier 
can secure higher regulated prices without affecting its (pre-tax) earnings on competitive services 
by shifting costs from its unregulated to its regulated operations. 
                                                           
132 Access prices in the U.S. telecommunications industry reflect estimates of an efficient incumbent supplier 
would incur in supplying access, which can differ from the actual costs of the incumbent supplier. (See 
Rosston and Noll (2002), for example.) This pricing policy is intended to induce incumbent suppliers to 
operate efficiently. 
133  See Woroch (2002). Boles de Boer et al. (2000) note that New Zealand encouraged facilities-based 
competition among Internet service providers while Australia relied more on regulation to protect 
consumers. The authors report lower prices in New Zealand than in Australia. 
134 Armstrong (1998) and Laffont et al. (1998) demonstrate these possibilities formally. DeGraba (2004) and 
Sharkey (2004), among others, analyze the effects of different inter-carrier compensation arrangements. 
  46  The incumbent supplier’s ability to undertake such cost shifting can be limited by requiring 
separate books of account for its regulated and unregulated operations, for example. The firm’s 
incentive to engage in cost shifting can be limited by reducing the extent to which regulated prices 
are linked to measured operating costs. In particular, price cap regulation can reduce incentives for 
cost shifting relative to rate of return regulation and other forms of cost-plus regulation.
135 
7.9   Ensure the Integrated Operation of All Elements of Industry Policy. 
  It is important to review industry policy in its entirety whenever a major component of industry 
policy (e.g., liberalization policy) is altered substantially. The review should be designed to ensure 
the ongoing, effective, integrated operation of all components of industry policy.  
  The experience in California’s electricity industry illustrates the importance of such a 
comprehensive review. The deregulation of wholesale electricity prices can benefit consumers when 
a competitive wholesale supply of electricity is available. Encouraging major buyers and suppliers 
of wholesale electricity to participate in a common exchange system also can provide widespread 
benefits. Furthermore, a capped retail price for electricity can be a component of a sensible 
regulatory policy. However, even though each of these policies can have individual merit, the 
combination of these policies can lead to highly undesirable outcomes. As in California, volatile 
wholesale prices coupled with capped retail prices can jeopardize the financial integrity of retail 
suppliers of electricity. The problem can become particularly acute when the volatility of wholesale 
prices is increased by limiting the ability of retail suppliers to negotiate long term contracts for 
electricity. 
  Several of the policies cited above can be viewed as corollaries of the general principle that 
effective, integrated operation of all components of industry policy merit careful examination 
whenever liberalization is considered. For example, the need to rebalance retail prices and to afford 
incumbent suppliers appropriate pricing flexibility reflect prudent changes in certain elements of 
industry policy as other elements change. 
7.10   Increase Antitrust Scrutiny and Enforcement. 
  A central long-term goal of liberalization is to replace regulatory oversight and control with the 
disciplining forces of competition. Liberalization might be viewed as a process by which 
competitive forces are fostered and strengthened to the point where they, alone, can impose 
effective discipline on some or all of the incumbent supplier’s operations. The more pronounced the 
                                                           
135  Braeutigam and Panzar (1989), Brennan (1990), and Weisman (1993), among others, provide formal 
analyses of this issue. 
  47disciplinary role played by competition, the more important it is to protect competition and ensure it 
is not subverted by powerful industry participants. This is generally the role of antitrust policy. 
  Antitrust policy and regulatory policy differ in at least three fundamental respects. First, 
antitrust policy typically sets guidelines that describe in broad terms acceptable behavior and 
outcomes. In contrast, regulatory policy often specifies detailed rules (often that apply to particular 
firms) that define fairly precisely the limits on acceptable behavior and outcomes. Second, having 
specified  ex ante guidelines, antitrust policy typically entails ex post investigations of possible 
violations of the specified guidelines. Regulation, in contrast, often couples ex ante rules with 
ongoing industry oversight, rule refinement, and rule enforcement. Third, antitrust policy typically 
relies on edicts to discontinue anticompetitive behavior and associated fines (often in the form of 
damage payments to injured parties), while regulation often proscribes specific types of conduct 
(e.g., price discrimination or expansion into particular markets), and establishes detailed 
performance requirements and associated reward and penalty structures.
136 
  Antitrust and regulatory policy can play vital and complementary roles in the liberalization 
process. Indeed, it may be important to increase both regulatory oversight and antitrust enforcement 
as competition develops in the liberalized industry. Thus, the road to deregulation of an industry 
may not be a straight one. Increased antitrust enforcement and regulatory oversight may both be 
necessary temporarily to ensure that competition has the opportunity to develop to the point where it 
can eventually replace regulation as the key source of discipline on the incumbent firm.
137 
  In the 1990s, New Zealand decided to rely solely on general competition laws enforced by the 
courts and by a non-specialized competition authority to govern activities in the 
telecommunications and electricity sectors. This novel approach was not an immediate failure. 
However, problems emerged over time, leading the government to realize the need for more 
orthodox regulatory control. The problems included a heavy case load for the courts and substantial 
difficulty in proving an incumbent supplier had abused its dominant position. Moreover, legal 
proceedings proved to move slowly at times when quick decisions were required to keep pace with 
rapid technological advance. The New Zealand experience suggests that exclusive reliance on 
competition law may not be sufficient in network industries with emerging competition, even in 
                                                           
136 See, for example, Borreau and Dogan (2001), Sidak (2003), Cave (2004), and Gerardin and Sidak (2005). 
Carlton and Picker (2005) note that regulation can allow interested parties greater ongoing intervention in 
the control process than antitrust.  
137Ultimately, explicit regulatory control may be replaced in some settings simply by the specter of 
regulatory intervention. See Glazer and McMillan (1992), for example. 
  48countries with well-developed case law, strong legal institutions, and substantial judicial 
resources.
138 
8.   Conclusions. 
  The foregoing discussion has produced two broad conclusions. First, even the apparently 
simple choice between regulated monopoly and unregulated competition is not always 
straightforward in practice. The appropriate choice between these regimes can vary with the 
relevant technological and demand conditions, with the regulator’s skills and resources, with the 
efficiency of tax systems and capital markets, and with the strength of other prevailing institutions.  
Second, in settings where competition is preferable to regulated monopoly, the road from monopoly 
to competition can be a particularly long and winding road. There is no single ideal path from 
monopoly to competition. The most appropriate liberalization policy depends upon a wide variety 
of factors, including those relevant to the choice between monopoly and regulation. 
  The foregoing discussion also has emphasized that, although there is no single liberalization 
policy that is ideal in all settings, some policies typically are superior to others. Liberalization 
policies that primarily aid some competitors and handicap others on an ongoing basis can hinder the 
development of vigorous long-term competition. Therefore, policies such as establishing temporary 
monopolies or oligopolies, excluding foreign investors, specifying market share targets for industry 
suppliers, providing entrants with long-term subsidized access to the incumbent’s infrastructure, 
restricting unduly the incumbent supplier’s pricing flexibility, and imposing unfunded carrier-of-
last-resort obligations exclusively on incumbent suppliers generally are not recommended. 
  In contrast, liberalization policies that remove barriers to entry and empower consumers to 
discipline industry suppliers typically are better methods for fostering vigorous long-term industry 
competition. In particular, policies like reducing customer switching costs, re-balancing the 
incumbent supplier’s prices to better reflect its operating costs, privatizing state-owned enterprises, 
prohibiting below-cost pricing, and establishing appropriate (access) prices for the use of critical 
infrastructure generally are recommended.  
  In addition, careful monitoring of industry operations can be of critical importance during the 
liberalization process. Accurate, timely data about the nature and intensity of industry competition 
will allow regulatory policy to adjust quickly to changes in industry conditions. Consequently, 
although liberalization should ultimately lead to reduced regulatory oversight and control, more 
pronounced regulatory and antitrust oversight may be required on an interim basis to ensure that 
                                                           
138 Spiller and Cardilli (1997) and Laffont (2005, pp. 200-202). 
  49regulatory policy is tailored appropriately to the evolving level of competition and that competition 
is protected. 
  The road from monopoly to competition is seldom straight and smooth. Detours (e.g., increased 
regulatory and antitrust scrutiny) may be necessary to ensure safe passage to the intended 
destination. Bumps in the road (e.g., widespread opposition to rate re-balancing or privatization of 
state-owned enterprises) should be anticipated in order to facilitate their navigation in as smooth a 
manner as possible. Thus, the liberalization process can constitute a challenging journey, and one 
that entails considerable uncertainty. Detailed road maps can be of enormous value on such 
journeys. Unfortunately, though, because every setting in which liberalization might be 
contemplated is different, road maps that provide sufficient granularity and specificity in every 
relevant setting are not available. Therefore, one generally must embark on the road to competition 
armed only with the coarse route markers on which the foregoing discussion has focused.  
  As emphasized in section 4, the most appropriate liberalization policy can vary considerably 
according to the institutional setting in which it is being implemented. Therefore, an important role 
for future research is to develop detailed maps of the best route to competition, i.e., to specify the 
precise details of liberalization policies that will work well in specific institutional settings. Two 
approaches to this task seem particularly fruitful. First, the broad principles reviewed in this paper 
can be translated into precise policy recommendations. (For example, precisely how rapidly should 
rates be re-balanced, given the prevailing prices, customer wealth, and the operating technologies of 
the incumbent suppliers and entrants? Alternatively, at precisely what level should access prices be 
set given the prevailing industry costs structure and retail prices?) Second, case studies and 
comprehensive empirical work can be undertaken to assess the success and failure of particular 
liberalization policies in different institutional settings. Together, these two approaches can expand 
our knowledge of the liberalization policies that will best harness the powers of competition to 
provide critical industry discipline, and perhaps ultimately replace the costly, imperfect discipline 
that regulatory oversight and control provide.  
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